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ABSTRACT
While
president

conflict
and

the

has

always

existed

over

war-making

Congress

between

the

roles,

the

president's

Commander-in-Chief

role

has

expanded

significantly

since World

II.

This

study

examines

power

in

terms

expansion

of

War

presidential

of

the

establishment of the United States as a world economic and
political power and the development of nuclear weapons.
Case

studies

were

selected

from

each

of

the

administrations

from Truman through Reagan to illustrate

these

The

points.

Truman

administration

is

studied

in

terms of the war in Korea and the advent of the limited war
concept in a nuclear-powered world.
President

Eisenhower's

massive

retaliation

strategy

represents the first real national military strategy.

It

set

of

the

stage

for

an

unprecedented

standing

force

nuclear weapons as the U.S. moved to the center stage of
world power.
The

Kennedy

administration's

handling

of

the

Cuban

Missile Crisis outlines the problems of massive retaliation
strategy as other nations continued to develop their own
forces.

It also points out the need for a sole decision

maker in crisis situations and changes in the concept of
imminent danger.
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964 granted the
broadest

possible

powers

to
vi

President

Johnson

as

he

pursued American interests in Vietnam.

The resolution led

to the largest presidentially made war in American history.
President Nixon's decision to bomb and invade Cambodia
in 1970 was an extension of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
This decision served as the final straw for Congress in
terms of presidential power and resulted in the War Powers
Act of 1973.
The

Ford

Administration's

handling

of

the

Mavaguez

seizure in 1975 and President Carter's approach to the Iran
hostage crisis

in 1979

illustrate the presidency

post-War Powers Act environment.

in the

Both men gave lip service

to the law, but basically continued to act as presidents
before them had done.
President Reagan's leadership in invading Grenada in
1983

finally

illustrates

the use

of

strong presidential

power, yet recognizes the role of Congress in war-making by
complying with the provisions of the War Powers Act.
This thesis concludes that presidential war powers
expanded to an all time high by 1973, and then levelled
off.
the

Much of the time since then has been spent seeking
correct

balance

between

the

president

based on the provisions of the War Powers Act.

vii

and

Congress

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution states,
"The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the
several States, when called into the actual Service of the
United States..."

At the same time, Article I, Section 8

grants various powers to the Congress including "To declare
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support
Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be
for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a
Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the land and naval Forces; To provide for calling forth the
Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the
Service of the United States, reserving to the States
respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the
Authority of training the Militia according to the
discipline prescribed by Congress..."
Clearly the framers of the Constitution meant for the
executive and the legislature to share war powers in order
to fight only "just wars" and limit the possibilities of
personal military excursions conducted so frequently at
that time by the monarchs of Europe.
1

The actual text of
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the Constitution thus becomes one influence on the division
of authority between the president and Congress.
issues also have an impact, however.

Other

Among them are the

real intentions of those attending the constitutional
convention, evolving beliefs, and actual practice since
1789.(1)
The basic trend over the last two hundred years has
been one of presidential aggrandizement of war powers.
This trend seems to run contrary to the intentions of the
framers, and thus must be more a result of other
influences.

According to Reveley:

The weight of the evidence at Philadelphia does
suggest that a majority of the Framers by September
wished an Executive who would be more than an
agent of Congress. But to conclude from that
purpose that the Framers, without saying so, also
intended to clothe the President with an indeterminate
reservoir of foreign and military authority via
the executive-power clause is difficult, given
the Framers' caution concerning executive power
and their expressed desire to limit it.(2)
Other legal scholars conclude that the Framers intended for
the president to conduct war only after Congress made the
decision to initiate it.

This conclusion comes from

convention debate over the wording of Article I.
Originally, Congress was to be granted the power to "make
war," but after arguments by Madison concerning the need to
"repel sudden attacks" the phrase was changed to read "To
declare war."(3)

Clearly, historical events have moved the

intentions of the framers to an academic position as the
commander-in-chief powers of the president have continued

3

to expand.

Occasional debates surface in political

rhetoric and academic study, but the intentions of the
framers today hold little weight in determining
presidential war powers.
It did not take long for different beliefs to evolve
concerning presidential war powers.

During the

ratification debate, Alexander Hamilton authored Federalist
#69 where he described the commander-in-chief clause as
"nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the
military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of
the Confederacy."

He strongly implied that the president

could only fight a war once committed to that war by
Congress.

About the same time, James Madison wrote to

Thomas Jefferson, "The Constitution supposes what the
History of all Governments demonstrates that the Executive
is the branch of power most interested in war and most
prone to it.

It has accordingly with studied care vested

the question in the Legislature."(4)

However, shortly

after ratification of the Constitution by the states,
Hamilton seemed to allow for a bit more war-making power by
the president.
It is the peculiar and exclusive province of
Congress, when the nation is at peace to change
that state into a state of war; whether from
calculations of policy, or from provocations,
or injuries received: in other words, it belongs
to Congress only, to go to War. But when a foreign
nation declares, or openly and avowedly makes
war upon the United States, they are then by the
very fact already at war, and any declaration on
the part of Congress is nugatory; it is at least
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unnecessary.(5)
Hamilton's statement illustrates some of the problems with
the text of the Constitution and transcripts of the
convention concerning war powers.

There seems to be a

problem of how the war powers are shared between the
president and the Congress.

Different circumstances can

determine how and when a nation is at war.

These different

situations require a clearly discernable outline of powers
indicating who does what.
point.

The Constitution is weak on this

Really, all references to war powers of the

president and Congress in the Constitution concern a time
that the United States is prepared to initiate and conduct
a war to secure its own clearly supported interests.
Thomas points out the problem with this vagueness.
The language of the Constitution is ambiguous. Nor
does the intent of the framers emerge from their
debates with the clarity which might be desired.
Perhaps the language of the constitutional debates
would indicate that a larger portion of the war
power was to be placed in the Congress, and insofar
as the United States is concerned that body through
its power to declare war would be empowered to
initiate war. The President would be left free to
repel sudden attacks. But what is meant by sudden
attacks? Moreover, no clear-cut answer is to be
found to the question of the President's power to
use force short of war.(6)
What exactly is meant by sudden attacks?

Does the

president have to wait until the nation comes under attack
to have the power to use military forces in self-defense?
Or, if intelligence sources indicate the probability of
imminent attack, can the president act in a pre-emptive way
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to defeat the attacker?

Good military doctrine supports

the concept of pre-emptive strikes and international law
allows pre-emptive action to protect a nation's
sovereignty, but the Constitution is unclear about who has
the power to initiate such action.
To expand the question, do American people and
equipment outside the borders of the United States fall
under the same type of protection from "sudden attacks?"
Obviously, the framers were not able to forecast advances
in transportation and communication which make these
questions so much more complicated.

They also never appear

to have considered the use of military force for anything
short of full scale war.
Considering these weaknesses, evolving beliefs and
historical precedents will actually do a better job of
describing and explaining presidential war powers.

As

stated earlier, the historical trend has been to increase
the powers of the president as commander-in-chief.

First,

the constitutional basis of presidential war powers evolved
from delegated to inherent powers of the president as
commander-in-chief.

Next, the role evolved from a simple

military commander to a vast reservoir of indeterminate
powers in times of emergencies.

Finally, history provides

examples of sweeping legislative powers claimed by Congress
being delegated to the president to the extent needed to
carry out commander-in-chief duties.(7)

Presidential war
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powers have expanded steadily since ratification of the
Constitution.

With the possible exception of the Civil

War, the most visible expansion of presidential war powers
has occurred since World War II.

It is probable that this

most recent expansion of power has resulted from changing
circumstances affecting the presidency.

These changes

include rapidly advancing technology and extensive treaty
commitments positioning the United States as a world
leader.
This study attempts to explain the expansion of
presidential power as commander-in-chief since World War II
in terms of two developments:

a new U.S. position as a

world leader in economics and politics, and the development
of nuclear weapons.

At the end of World War II, the United

States emerged as the pre-eminent economic power in the
world.

While the nations who had their territory used as a

battlefield struggled to rebuild, Americans enjoyed
unprecedented wealth.

Appropriately, the United States was

thrust into a leadership role in rebuilding the world
economy.
Similarly, the United States and the Soviet Union
emerged as the world's political powers.

Cold War

pressures and world needs for economic development led to
extensive treaty commitments with the American president in
a clear leadership role.
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Lastly, technological developments had made the world
a smaller place.

More advanced communications and

information systems and weapons of mass destruction made
the need for quick decision making with respect to war
making much more critical.
Since this expansion is so difficult to quantify in
terms of some number and the constitutional aspects of the
question are so vague, I plan to present case studies from
each administration from Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan to
support my claim of expanded presidential war powers
since World War II.

This method assumes that evolving

beliefs about war powers and real actions of various
presidents explain the expansion of the commander-in-chief
role.
Case studies have the obvious disadvantage of
difficulty in generalizing their conclusions to the "big
picture."

However, they are useful with issues like this

for several reasons.

First, and probably most important,

case studies provide an appreciation for real time
constraints on researchers and decision makers.

For

instance, this study will cover one particular case under
each president since World War II.

To study fully the

president as commander-in-chief during this period alone
would be a very large project.

One source claims that

between 1945 and 1975 (two administrations fewer than
are dealt with here), the United States was involved in 215
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military incidents, police actions, or shows of force,
including two threats of nuclear action.(8)
A second advantage of case studies stems from the
constitutional side of this issue.

Policy questions like

presidential war powers are often ill-defined.

Because

no one has been able to clearly write down what the policy
is, case studies tend to clarify what is really going on.
Before turning to the cases since World War II,
it is important to gain an understanding of the historical
context of presidential war powers in order to see how
significant the more recent changes have been.

Throughout

history, a variety of matters have been addressed by
presidents acting as commander-in-chief without explicit
Congressional approval.(9)

In terms of military action,

there have been short term deployments, long term
stationing of troops on foreign soil, training and advising
of foreign forces, providing armament or naval protection
to merchant vessels, airlifting supplies over hostile or
disputed territory, searches and seizures of foreign
vessels or aircraft, naval blockades, covert intelligence
operations, threats and assurances of U.S. military action,
and actual combat operations.
Associated nonmilitary actions include concern over
the treatment of Americans abroad and the giving and
receiving of official apologies.

Presidents have stated

foreign economic claims and terms concerning foreign
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officials and troops, as well as conducted foreign
political operations.

They have participated in summits,

conferences and international organizations, recognized
governments, and made threats and assurances of U.S.
non-military action, all without the expressed approval of
Congress.

These actions have all been justified under the

commander-in-chief powers of the president.
The traditions and precedents of the
commander-in-chief powers have developed most during times
of war, but significant precedents have been set outside of
war.

In 1807, Thomas Jefferson, one of the framers most

distrusting of a strong independent executive, acted in the
first real way to expand the powers of the president as
commander-in-chief.(10)

After Congress had recessed for

the year, the British navy fired on the American vessel
Chesapeake.

Without calling Congress back into session or

even consulting with Congressional leaders, Jefferson
ordered emergency military supplies sent to help.

In

justifying his action, Jefferson stated that observance of
the written law was important, but not as important as
self-preservation and national security.
James Madison was president during the War of 1812.
Madison preferred to delegate his military authority to
subordinate commanders and the cabinet.

He had no military

experience himself, and had more special interest in the
legal and political workings of government.(11)

Despite
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this lack of interest in military affairs, Madison did take
an active role in war planning.

He concerned himself with

naval superiority on the Great Lakes, defense of the city
of Washington, and the dispatch of Andrew Jackson to New
Orleans to protect the mouth of the Mississippi.
Madison's Secretary of War, John Armstrong took
advantage of the president's "hands off" approach to seek
his own political fortune.

He routinely began to disregard

instructions from the president.

When Madison discovered

this, he became much more involved as commander-in-chief.
He reminded Armstrong that he was under the supervision of
and subject to the orders of the president and ordered him
to clear all further instructions concerning military
operations through him.

Madison even briefly exercised

direct command over O.S. forces during the British attack
on Washington.
In 1846, President Polk acted to vastly expand his
power as commander-in-chief.

Polk ordered General Zachary

Taylor to take troops into disputed territory between the
Neuces and Rio Grande Rivers.(12)

Mexico attacked Taylor's

army on the grounds that American forces had invaded
Mexican territory.

Polk then went to Congress asking for

and receiving a declaration of war on May 11, 1846.(13)
After the war declaration, Polk took an active part in
commanding military operations.

With the help of the

cabinet, Polk already had a grand strategy mapped out when
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war was declared.(14)

He issued orders to Taylor directing

advances into northern Mexico, to Kearney taking
California, and formulated plans for an invasion from the
Gulf coast near Mexico City.

Polk also directed the

administrative details of the military action.

He was

concerned with matters such as sailing dates for navy
ships, purchases of army pack animals, and processing of
every officer's commission.
Perhaps the largest expansion of presidential power as
commander-in-chief in the history of the United States came
during the Civil War.

Abraham Lincoln continued the

tradition started by Jefferson that self-preservation of
the nation was more important than adherence to written
law.

In fact, Robinson claims that Lincoln proved the

ability of the president to become a dictator using the
commander-in-chief clause in times of national
emergency.(15)
Despite a constitutional requirement for Congress to
authorize increases in the size of military forces, Lincoln
ordered such increases in the army and navy without
Congressional authorization.

He single-handedly suspended

the writ of habeas corpus, ordered civilians in front line
areas tried in military courts, nationalized the railroads
and wire systems under the War Department, and issued the
Emancipation Proclamation, freeing all slaves.(16)
addition, Lincoln ordered a naval blockade of the

In
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Confederacy without consulting Congress.

This 1863

blockade was upheld as an appropriate exercise of
commander-in-chief powers by the Supreme Court.(17)
President Lincoln did not stop there.

He also became

the first president to exercise direct control of armies in
the field outside the immediate area of Washington.

Klotz

explains that several different factors account for this
active involvement.(18)

First, the Civil War was the first

American war where information about troop movements and
results of battles could be learned in a matter of hours,
rather than days or weeks.

War Department controlled

telegraph lines rapidly relayed information to Washington
where the president could act on near real-time
information.
The Navy and War Departments' failure to develop a
strategic command and control system prior to 1861 also led
to active presidential involvement in operations.

In the

army, planning and command responsibility rested with the
commanding general officer.

Lincoln had many difficulties

with this system, finding it difficult to find a general he
could trust.

Until Grant was appointed in 1864, Lincoln

was forced to plan strategy and supervise action in the
field.
Lastly, the nature of the Civil War itself called for
active involvement by the commander-in-chief.

The goal of

the conflict was not defeat of an external enemy, but
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rather preservation of the union itself.

Social, political

and economic norms became closely tied to military
objectives.

Lincoln felt that the Confederacy had to be

defeated before other nations recognized its existence and
possibly came to its aid.

The need for a speedy victory

amidst commanding union generals with their own political
agendas served as a cause for Lincoln to exercise command
authority.
Despite expansion of presidential commander-in-chief
authority due to the unique circumstances of the Civil War,
the trend returned to indirect presidential command under
William McKinley.

Klotz claims that McKinley's style was

due to his lack of mental preparedness for war.(19)
In the several months prior to April 1898, McKinley
concentrated his efforts on finding a peaceful solution to
the call for Cuban independence.

McKinley's subordinates

in the armed forces, however, had already worked out a
strategy for conducting a war against Spain.

Once war was

declared, McKinley merely became a "rubber stamp" for
military commanders' plans.
Despite his lack of direct command over operations in
the Spanish-American War, McKinley had more resources
available than any previous president enabling him to run
the show from Washington if he wished.(20)

The War Room on

the White House second floor consisted of 25 telegraph and
15 telephone lines connecting the president to commanders
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in the Army and Navy.

Maps indicating troop positions and

movements were also included.

A worldwide network of

underwater telegraph cables also allowed the American navy
to be directed to change plans without ships returning to
port.

The most likely reason for McKinley not feeling the

pressure of previous presidents to control the war was that
the war was short, publicly supported, and easily winnable.
America's next wartime president, Woodrow Wilson, was
even less involved in the actual conduct of military
operations in World War I.

Wilson's background in public

administration rather than in military matters led him to
delegate authority for planning and execution to officials
of the War and Navy Departments.

His absence was even

striking to the commanding general— General John Pershing.
He remembered,
In the actual conduct of operations I was given
entire freedom and in this respect was to enjoy
an experience unique in our history.(21)
Wilson's hands off style does not indicate, however, an
abdication of presidential power as commander-in-chief.
1917, he ordered the arming of the U.S. merchant fleet to
protect American shipping from U-boat attacks by the
Germans.(22)

Wilson also called on Congress to grant him

powers to mobilize war making resources by regulating
essential items, requisitioning fuels, foods and feeds,
taking over factories, and regulating prices. (23)

In
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World War II brought the permanent return of active
presidential involvement as commander-in-chief.

Franklin

Roosevelt's personality and administrative style made him
an active commander-in-chief, but the technological
developments in weaponry and the politics of the post-war
world would force all presidents after him to be strong
commanders.
FDR had military experience which made him comfortable
in the commander-in-chief role.

He served as Assistant

Secretary of the Navy in World War I and stayed in touch
with naval developments after that.(24)

Throughout the

war, Roosevelt maintained an administrative hierarchy which
kept him at the top of military decision making.

Although

the president's role as commander-in-chief in World War II
alone is a whole story in itself, several highlights
indicate the power exercised by FDR.
On October 5, 1937, the president denied any further
U.S. claim to neutrality in his famous "quarantine" speech
where protection of shipping lanes from a German naval
threat became a priority.

In September 1940, the president

concluded an executive agreement selling 50 destroyers to
Great Britain without consulting Congress until after the
fact.

The lend-lease program begun in January 1941 was

another presidential initiative carried out without
expressed Congressional approval.

All of these events

occurred long before any direct U.S. military involvement
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in the war.(25)

World War II conferences at Casablanca,

Quebec, Cairo, Teheran, and Yalta also provided
well-publicized opportunities for the president to act
decisively as commander-in-chief.
W. Taylor Reveley III traces the growth of
presidential war-making authority to three factors:
the evolving nature of those institutional
characteristics of the presidency and Congress
pertinent to the war powers; certain historical
developments that have forced the Executive's
characteristics over those of Congress; and,
finally, the willingness of many Presidents,
greater than that of Congress, to exercise
their constitutional authority to the fullest
and beyond.(26)
It is important to understand why each of the
following cases was chosen and just how the nature of
presidential war powers has changed since World War II.
The Truman administration's handling of the Korean War is
critical because it illustrates the first changes in the
very nature of war fighting due to the existence of nuclear
weapons.

The concept of limited war as demonstrated in

Korea springs directly from the president's fear of
escalation of the war to a nuclear exchange between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Cold War competition and the

possibility of mass death and destruction called for
increased attention from the commander-in-chief in order to
limit the war and avoid escalation to a nuclear
confrontation.

This increased attention by the president

also forever changed the relationship between the civilian
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commander-in-chief and the military leaders who fought the
war.
Massive retaliation strategy developed under President
Eisenhower is important to our discussion because it
reflects the first complete national military strategy
developed and carried out during peacetime.

Again,

American presence as an economic, political, and military
leader in the nuclear age called for an active
commander-in-chief to develop his foreign policy based on
complex military considerations.

The American tradition of

small peacetime armies with rapid and massive mobilization
of troops and equipment during time of war was no longer a
realistic policy.

The speedy nature of the nuclear threat

from the Soviet Union called for large standing forces
capable of nearly instant response.

These large standing

forces brought with them an unprecedented peacetime defense
budget.
The Cuban Missile Crisis resulted from weaknesses in
the Massive Retaliation strategy.

It was now evident that

large stockpiles of nuclear weapons, although fairly cheap,
were not an effective deterrent to expanding communist
influence.

American inability to demonstrate the will to

use such weapons for anything short of major conquest on
the part of the Soviets destroyed American credibility.
Such weakness encouraged a challenge from the Soviets.
Placement of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba demonstrated
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the need for a more credible American defense policy, but
more importantly, demonstrated the need for a strong
president to react quickly and accurately in a crisis
situation.

The nuclear threat increased the stakes in

presidential crisis decision making.
Until the mid-1960s, the Congress remained mostly
silent as presidential war powers steadily included more
responsibility.

President Johnson's leadership in Vietnam

led to a change in that position.

The Gulf of Tonkin

incident triggered a large grant of war powers from the
Congress to the president in the form of the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution.

No act of Congress in history gave the

president broader war powers without a declaration of war.
As the details of the incident unfolded, serious
misrepresentations were uncovered that destroyed
Congressional trust in the president.
The conflict between the Congress and the president
reached a turning point during the Nixon administration.
Here we study the Cambodia invasion because it served as a
"last straw" for a Congress and nation which had grown
weary of the fighting in Vietnam.

Presidential war powers

had reached a peak as President Nixon carried the war into
another sovereign country without the knowledge or consent
of the Congress.

In order to reassert itself in the field

of war powers, the Congress passed the War Powers
Resolution of 1973 over President Nixon's veto.
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The last three cases reflect attempts to balance the
war powers of the president and Congress.

Interestingly,

all three were classified as rescue attempts; at least two
arguably included more military force than was necessary to
merely rescue American citizens.
The Ford administration's handling of the Havaguez
seizure is important because it was the first military
action following the passage of the War Powers Act.

It

illustrates continued presidential war making power with
disregard for most aspects of the new legislation.

Rather

than challenge the act in court, the administration chose
to ignore it and take the risk of Congressional opposition.
President Carter's attempt to rescue the hostages at
the U.S. embassy in Tehran represents a rescue attempt on a
more realistic scale.

In this case, little argument can be

made that the president was being adventuresome.

However,

the political repercussions of operational failure seemed
to be more damaging to the presidency than successful
full-scale military operations conducted without consulting
Congress.
Finally, President Reagan's orders to invade the
island of Grenada reflect more of a balance in presidential
and Congressional war powers.

For the first time, the

president appeared to recognize and accept the limitations
of the War Powers Act.

His willingness to abide by all

provisions of the act are a significant change and may
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indicate movement toward more cooperation between the
president and the Congress with regard to future war powers
questions.
The war powers of the president appear to have
undergone a fundamental change after World War II.

Up

until 1973, presidential war powers continued to grow at a
perhaps alarming rate based on changing conditions
affecting the presidency.

With passage of the War Powers

Act, this expansion seems to have slowed.

Presidents since

then have been trying to find the proper balance between
themselves and the Congress that allows for adequate
handling of war powers emergencies.
We will now examine historical cases from each
presidency since World War II and find that development of
nuclear weapons and growth of the United States as a world
economic and military power during that period have
significantly expanded the president's war powers.

CHAPTER II. TRUMAN-LIMITED WAR IN KOREA
Harry S. Truman is the only president in this study to
have experienced two major wars as the commander-in-chief.
His administration, therefore, provides numerous examples
of a president exercising his commander-in-chief powers.
For purposes of this study, we will focus only on the
second war of the Truman administration, the war in Korea.
This case is unique and important because it involved
the first use of the United Nations in a combat situation.
In the past, commitment of U.S. forces to military
situations allied with other military forces was only as a
result of a specific treaty.

In this case, American

membership in the United Nations was certainly established
by treaty, but use of American military forces by that
organization was a much more indirect agreement.
The Korean War is also important to the expansion of
presidential war powers since World War II because it
represents the first changes in the nature of war making
due to the existence of nuclear weapons.

The limited war

concept developed directly from President Truman's fear
that the conflict might escalate to a nuclear exchange
with the Soviets if a "total war" was fought.

Cold War

competition and fears of the destruction of civilization
created the need for increased attention to military
details by the president acting as commander-in-chief.
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As the only American with the power to order the use of
nuclear weapons, President Truman felt that he alone would
decide the strategy of the war.

Participation in the

United Nations and the existence of nuclear weapons would
be crucial to the development of modern presidential war
powers.
The historical background concerning Korea and the
United Nations is important to understanding how and why
things happened the way they did in 1950.

After the atomic

bombings of August 6th and 9th, 1945, the president was
encouraged by many of his advisors to occupy the Korean
peninsula.

Basically, the goal these advisors had was to

race the Soviets for influence over territory before the
end of the Second World War.(27)
The War Department suggested the 38th parallel as an
operational/occupational dividing line between U.S. and
Soviet forces.

As Secretary of State Dean Acheson

remembers:
On about the 12th of August, 1945, the Pentagon
sent over to us in the State Department— I was then
an Assistant Secretary of State— a memorandum dealing
with many affairs, but among them it said that the
Japanese troops north of the 38th parallel in Korea
should surrender to the Russians and those south
should surrender to a representative of General
MacArthur.
This was exactly what it purported to be. It did not
intend to be a boundary. It did not intend to be
zones of occupation. It was merely that for
convenience troops north of this dividing line should
surrender to one commander, those south of it to
another. And this was done.
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Immediately afterward we discovered in Korea, as we
discovered in Germany, that when one dealt with the
Russians any sort of dividing line meant much more
than one had supposed it was going to mean. It meant
that an Iron Curtain descended at that point and that
everything north of the 38th parallel became
completely Russian and everything south under Allied
or American control.(28)
President Truman accepted the War Department
recommendation and issued General Order No. 1 to General
MacArthur, commander of the Pacific theater.

This order

outlined the details of the impending Japanese surrender
and established the 38th parallel as the operational
dividing line for the surrender of Japanese forces in the
Korean peninsula.

The XXIV Corps in Okinawa would accept

the Japanese surrender south of the 38th parallel.

Stalin

approved of Truman's plan and arranged to accept the
surrender north of 38 degrees north.(29)
The first warning of possible military trouble came
from the U.S. commander in Korea, General Hodge, who voiced
concern about the Russian attitude toward Korean territory.
In February, 1947, Hodge told the president a civil war
would break out if the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could not soon
agree on a plan for Korean unification.
In the summer of 1947, General MacArthur agreed with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff that American occupation of
southern Korea was not cost effective.

MacArthur conceded

that Korea was of little strategic importance to the United
States and recommended withdrawing troops stationed
there.(30)
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President Truman then went to the United Nations with
the Soviet occupation problem.

On September 17, 1947,

George Marshall made a speech to the UN proposing elections
in each sector supervised by a UN commission.

This

election would serve as the basis for a new government and
arrangements would be made for withdrawal of all American
and Soviet forces.

The Soviet delegation countered with a

proposal for a complete withdrawal of all forces by spring
1948, leaving the Koreans to their own devices to organize
a government.

The interesting point of this proposal is

that the Soviets would leave a well-equipped and
well-trained North Korean force alone with an unarmed and
disorganized group of South Koreans.

The United Nations

ultimately approved the American proposal over a Soviet
abstention.(31)
Despite the UN plan, the commission sent to run the
election was denied access to the northern sector by the
Red Army.

As a result, elections were only conducted in

southern Korea and the Republic of Korea was formed on July
17, 1948.

The United States transferred power to the new

government on August 15.

The Soviets did eventually

withdraw their forces from North Korea after the Americans
left, establishing a communist government in North Korea by
June 29, 1949.
Speaking to the National Press Club on January 12,
1950, Secretary of State Acheson described a defensive
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perimeter that would define U.S. strategic interests in the
Pacific.

A line running from Alaska through the Aleutian

islands to Japan south through the Ryuku islands to the
Philippines would serve as a forward area of defense.

This

perimeter, drawn by the Joint Chiefs, the National Security
Council, and the president and agreed to by MacArthur,
intentionally did not include Korea.
Although facts later uncovered no longer support the
claim, right wing Republicans would claim that Secretary
Acheson invited a North Korean invasion by leaving Korea
out of the perimeter.

In fact, the Secretary said,

So far as the military security in the other areas
of the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that
no person can guarantee these areas against military
attack...But should such an attack occur, the initial
reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it
and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized
world under the charter of the United Nations.(30)
Even as this speech was made, North Korean hit and run
squads were making guerilla raids south of the 38th
parallel to create disorder.
the spring of 1950.

These raids continued through

The Central Intelligence Agency

informed the president that North Korea was ready for
full-scale war at any time.

MacArthur aide Major General

Courtney Whitney reported that 1500 intelligence warnings
were sent to Washington that spring including one on March
10, indicating a strong possibility of a June attack.(32)
Despite the large number of warnings, Korea was only one of
several potential hot spots identified that spring.
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Back in the United Nations, another event took place
that would have profound effects on the events of June,
1950.

In early January, arguments were heard concerning

the Chinese seat both in the General Assembly and as a
permanent member of the Security Council.

Mao's recent

successful revolution in China created the dilemma of
another communist government on the Security Council.

The

United States maintained that the government on Formosa was
still the legitimate government of China while the Soviets
claimed Mao's government was the only legitimate Chinese
government.

When the American position won out, the

Soviets walked out of the Security Council.

This loss of a

veto position would later be very important to action in
Korea.
At 4:00am local time on June 25, 1950, forces of the
North Korean army invaded South Korea.
was along the Onjin peninsula.

Their first thrust

Five U.S. advisors with the

17th ROK regiment soon radioed Seoul that they were about
to be overrun.

While amphibious landings took place on the

eastern coast, seven well-armed and well-trained North
Korean infantry divisions totalling 90,000 men attacked
along the border where defenses consisted of five thin ROK
divisions.

North Korean forces captured Kaesong 35 miles

northwest of the capital of Seoul within hours.
As stated in Acheson's January speech, the United
States had no plans in place to repel the attack.
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Secretary Acheson informed the president at his home in
Independence.

Truman's first decision was to call on the

UN Security Council, but he also remarked to Acheson,
"Dean, we've got to stop the sons of bitches no matter
what."(33)

It was evident the president would act

regardless of what the United Nations decided.

On what

basis the president felt justified in using U.S. forces
without a UN resolution or declaration of war by Congress
is unclear.

Statements made later indicate President

Truman felt his position as commander-in-chief of the armed
forces was sufficient authority to use those forces when
carrying out administration foreign policy.
Immediate recommendations were made by the State and
Defense Departments.

Acheson specifically called for

American nationals to be evacuated from Korea, use of the
U.S. Air Force to protect the evacuation and secure ports
and airports, orders to General MacArthur to give ROK
forces additional arms and ammunition, positioning the 7th
fleet in the Formosa Strait to prevent a conflict with
mainland China, additional assistance to South Korea based
on a UN Security Council resolution, and an increase in
military aid to Indochina.(34)
historical precedent.

These moves followed

Use of American forces would be

strictly to protect Americans on foreign soil.

Even before

the Security Council had a chance to meet, Assistant
Secretary of State for UN Affairs John Hickerson said,
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"...a decision was reached for us to give all-out air and
naval support, under the United Nations, to Korea."(35)
This decision did open new questions concerning the
authority of the president to commit U.S. forces to action
under the United Nations without consultation with or
approval of Congress.
The first report arriving from General MacArthur
indicated that all territory west of the Imjin River was
lost.

This included the Onjin peninsula and the cities of

Yonan, Panmunjom, and Kaesong.

He called for immediate

U.S. air support to protect the Seoul airport.

An

evacuation of American personnel was begun immediately.
In Moscow, U.S. embassy staffer Walworth Barbour
reported the attack as,
a clear-cut Soviet challenge which in our considered
opinion the U.S. should answer firmly and swiftly as
it constitutes direct threat [to] our leadership of
the free world against Soviet Communist imperialism.
The ROK is a creation of U.S. policy and of U.S.-led
UN action. Its destruction would have calculably
grave unfavorable repercussions for the U.S. in Japan,
SEA (southeast Asia) and in other areas as well.(36)
Barbour stressed that all assistance, including military,
would be needed to keep the South Koreans independent.
Truman did consider asking Congress for a joint
resolution of support before acting, but was convinced to
avoid such a request by Acheson.

The Secretary explained,

"it would precipitate attacks on him by hostile Republicans
and generate lengthy discussions of the eventual effect and
financial expenditures involved in this intervention."(37)
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The question remains whether threat of political attack by
the opposing party in Congress is sufficient justification
to commit military forces to battle without consulting with
the Congress.

As an alternative, the president decided to

meet with Congressional leaders on the morning of June 27
to inform them of the events in Korea and his decisions.
No one present in the initial staff meetings disputed the
president's actions.

Luckily for President Truman and

perhaps less luckily for constitutional scholars, this lack
of opposition from congressional leaders served as tacit
approval for presidential action.
Soon after Truman ordered military intervention, the
State Department released a statement explaining the powers
allowing the president to act without congressional
approval.
The President, as commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the United States, has full control over
the use thereof. He also has authority to conduct
the foreign relations of the United States. Since
the beginning of the United States history, he has,
on numerous occasions, utilized these powers in
sending armed forces abroad.
The administration went so far as to declare that the
dispatch of troops to Korea was based on unlimited
presidential prerogative.

In testimony before the Senate

Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services,
Secretary Acheson stated:
Not only has the President the authority to use the
armed forces in carrying out the broad foreign policy
of the United States and implementing treaties, but it
is equally clear that this authority may not be
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interfered with by the Congress in the exercise of
powers which it has under the Constitution.(38)
Congress responded to this declaration with no
response at all.

Although a constitutional argument

certainly was available, it seems not enough opposition to
presidential action could be found in the Congress to mount
a serious threat to President Truman's plans.
It is entirely possible the president's advisors
recommended against a Congressional resolution in support
of his action in Korea because of previous legislation
indicating an unwillingness on the part of Congress to give
up war powers to the president.

In the post-world War II

environment, widespread approval was voiced for the United
Nations Charter, the document designed to keep the peace by
joint action.

Despite this near-unanimous support,

Congress refused to allow for the possibility of lone
action by the president.
Soon after acceptance of the UN Charter, Congress
passed the United Nations Participation Act.

The Act's

Section 6 authorized the president to negotiate military
agreements with the UN Security Council and make U.S.
forces available for peace-keeping operations.(39)
However, Congress withheld the right to determine how these
forces would be used.

The Act states that any agreements

negotiated with the Security Council are "subject to the
approval of Congress by appropriate act or joint
resolution."

In the Korean case, a lack of Congressional
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action must be interpreted as approval for the president's
actions.
Congress even took extra measures to insure that the
executive branch could not misinterpret the Act.

The

legislation included a provision that "nothing herein
contained shall be construed as an authorization to the
President by the Congress to make available to the Security
Council...armed forces, facilities, or assistance in
addition to the forces, facilities, and assistance provided
for in such special agreement or agreements."(40)
Secretary Acheson claims consideration of
Congressional opposition was not the reason the
administration did not seek a joint resolution.

They truly

felt the president was acting in accordance with the
commander-in-chief power outlined in the Constitution.

The

administration was more concerned that delays resulting
from discussion would be dangerous to our troops already
deployed in the theater.

In his words,

The outcome of the battle was not at all clear. It
seemed to me if, at this time, action was pending
before the Congress, by which hearings might be held,
and long inquiries were being entered into as to
whether the President had the authority to do it, or
whether we needed Congressional authority for matters
of that sort— we would be doing about the worst thing
we could possibly do for the support of our troops
and for their morale.(41)
Whatever the constitutional and legal issues, public
support for the president's action was initially very
positive.

The New York Times called the president's
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initiative "momentous and courageous" and said it "produced
a transformation in the spirit of the United States
Government."

New York's Herald Tribune also supported

Truman's intervention in Korea, saying, "The President has
acted-and-spoken-with a magnificent courage and terse
decision...It was time to draw a line."(42)
Congressional support for the president followed that
of the public.

The House of Representatives hurried to

extend the Selective Service Act by a vote of 315-4.
Truman was allowed to call up the National Guard and
reserves to active duty for up to 21 months.

Initially,

the only vocal dissent came from American Labor Party
representative Vito Marcantonio of New York who accused the
president of bypassing the constitution and declaring war
on Korea by himself.(43)
At 5:00am on June 30, 1950, President Truman approved
MacArthur's request for one regimental combat team to
reinforce the ROK army.

Later that morning the cabinet met

to consider Chiang Kai-shek's offer of 30,000 troops to
assist in the defensive effort.

Despite Nationalist

China's position as a permanent member of the UN Security
Council, the administration turned down the offer because
of problems of reliability, weakness, and lack of loyalty
to Chiang among the Chinese troops.

The cabinet also

approved authorizing General MacArthur to use his four
divisions and a naval blockade against the North Koreans.
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Again, the American media sided with the president.
Both the Washington Post and the New York Times published
editorials praising the president and his cabinet for their
firm and timely stand in Korea.(44)

It is unfortunate for

Truman that he did not even consider "backing in"
Congressional support for his action.

His view of himself

as the sole responsible individual for intervention in
Korea became a political nightmare once the war began to go
against UN forces.

Although it never acted to stop the

president, Congress found it easy to oppose him when the
going got tough.

An interesting lesson to be learned is

how political players can use the rules governing their
activities to pursue their own political agenda.

Congress

had no need to question the president's constitutional
authority when American forces were winning, but found that
constitutional question much more important once the war
had gone sour.
Some minor dissent was already starting to surface in
Congress where Senator Taft of Ohio said,
His action unquestionably has brought about a de facto
war with the government of northern Korea. He has
brought that war about without consulting Congress and
without congressional approval. We have a situation
in which in a far-distant part of the world one nation
has attacked another, and if the president can
intervene in Korea without congressional approval, he
can go to war in Malaya or Indonesia or Iran or South
America.(45)
The administration countered with the argument that
it was merely carrying out the intent of the United
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Nations Charter which allowed the Security Council to take
whatever military actions necessary to restore
international peace and security.
To fully understand Truman's actions in Korea as
commander-in-chief and his later problems with General
MacArthur, it is important to know just what the
administration's objectives in Korea were.

According to

President Truman:
The strong got away with attacking the weak, and I
wasn't going to let this attack on the Republic of
Korea, which had been set up by the United Nations,
go forward. Because if it wasn't stopped, it would
lead to a third world war, and I wasn't going to let
that happen. Not while I was President.
That's what a lot of people never understood,
including the general we had over there at the time.
This was a police action, a limited war, whatever
you want to call it to stop aggression and to prevent
a big war. And that's all it ever was. I don't know
why some people could never get that through their
heads.(46)
Bert Cochran points out that no one knew then, nor
really knows now whether Stalin called for or approved of
the North Korean attack.

It seems to have been at odds

with his generally cautious foreign policy toward areas of
American interest.

At least one former member of the

American occupation government claims that the North
Koreans acted in a manner designed to entrap the Soviets
into supporting them.(47)

In any case, all the president's

comments seem to indicate the United States assumed the
attack in Korea was only part of a Soviet master plan for
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world domination rather than the result of three years of
civil strife over an arbitrary border.
NSC Report 73/4 of August 25, 1950 outlined the U.8.
strategy based on the objectives stated by the president.
This report recommended to the president that he must
regain the initiative, deter further aggression, and
increase the American ability to defeat aggression.

These

goals were to be attained by building up military forces,
gaining intelligence information on UN members willing to
oppose the USSR on satellite aggression, and being prepared
to meet a Soviet attack with one of our own.(48)
Since globail war was considered imminent in the event
of a Soviet attack in Europe, it would be important to
localize action and resort to the United Nations.

It would

also be imperative to expose the Soviets as the aggressor
as early as possible to mobilize world opinion.
The Korean element of the strategy was to meet and
defeat a Soviet attack in the peninsula.

It was considered

imperative that we not engage Communist China in general
war.
President Truman addressed the nation on television
and radio on September 1, 1950 outlining the following
objectives in Korea.

First, the United States believed in

the United Nations Charter and with it, a free and
independent, united Korea.

We did not want expansion of

the conflict into general war, nor did we want to fight the
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Chinese.

Our goal was to keep Formosa out of the conflict,

but to insure its independence.

The United States believed

in the freedom of all far eastern nations.

We did not

believe in aggressive or preventive war, and above all, we
wanted peace.(49)
Two weeks after the president's address to a worried
nation, General MacArthur withdrew the marines from the
Pusan perimeter and combined them with his last army
division in Japan to form the offensive force of one of the
most impressive tactical moves in military history.

On

September 15, 1950, MacArthur's forces landed at Inchon
well behind the North Korean lines, secured the capital
city of Seoul and cut off communications and supply lines
to forward North Korean troops.

Simultaneously, American

forces around Pusan broke out of the perimeter sending the
North Koreans into retreat.
By early October, UN forces had returned to the 38th
parallel and were pursuing enemy divisions into North
Korea.

With the earlier goal of stopping aggression and

returning to the status quo achieved, the United Nations
now issued a proclamation on October 7th calling for the
invasion of North Korea in order to reunify the country.
This was actually a return to the original goal of the UN
stated November 14, 1947.

This change of goals would have

serious consequences for UN forces.
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In late October, UN forces began to capture Chinese
prisoners as they moved northward.

Although MacArthur did

not know it, General Nieh Yeh-jung, acting chief of the
Communist Chinese general staff, had discussed the American
crossing of the 38th parallel with the Indian ambassador to
Peking on September 25th.

At that time he told the

ambassador that China would not allow the United States to
advance to the Yalu River.

In public speeches on September

30th and October 1st, Chou En-lai added that China would
resist aggression in North Korea.

Finally, on October 3rd,

the Indian ambassador was informed that if the U.S. crossed
the 38th parallel, China would enter the war on the side of
the North Koreans.(50)
By the first weeks of November, large numbers of
Chinese troops had joined the North Koreans.

MacArthur

reported that enemy capabilities were now three times what
they had been before Chinese intervention.

An overwhelming

Chinese offensive followed, causing MacArthur to retreat
back south of the 38th parallel and give up Seoul by
January, 1951.
On December 14, the UN General Assembly resolved to
reestablish the 38th parallel as a ceasefire line.

The

October resolution calling for reunification was dropped,
and the goal once again became to restore the divided Korea
in existence in June.
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The constantly changing objective became a source of
irritation to General MacArthur and was a major cause of
his falling out with President Truman.

Back in August, the

general had written to the chief official of the Veterans
of Foreign Wars about U.S. policy toward Formosa.
President Truman had seen this letter as an attack on
his foreign policy and ordered MacArthur to withdraw it.
Although the general did so, Truman was ready to relieve
him then and replace him with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley.(51)

Advisors

cautioned the president that MacArthur was extremely
popular with Republican opponents of the admininistration
and firing him would be political suicide.
Instead, the president traveled to Wake Island to meet
MacArthur and come to an understanding about their
relationship.

Donovan calls the conference at Wake the

"high watermark of the Truman-MacArthur relationship."(52)
The two men discussed chances of Chinese intervention and
the general reportedly apologized to the president for this
VFW message.

All appeared to be well until the Chinese

entered the war.
MacArthur had interpreted the October 7th UN
resolution as a call for total victory in order to reunify
Korea.

The December change in plans ran contrary to his

sensibilities as a soldier.

On December 1st, General

MacArthur made statements to U.S. News and World Report and
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the United Press publicly criticizing U.S. policy and
saying the European allies were "selfish" and
"shortsighted" in opposing the expansion of the war to
fight China.

He called the order limiting bombing to

targets outside Manchuria "an enormous handicap, without
precedent in military history."(53)
International response was incredible and the
president called Acheson, General Marshall, and General
Bradley together to determine what to do about the
general's statements.

Despite all the clamor and evident

insubordination, Truman still did not seriously consider
firing the general.
him up.

"You pick your man, you've got to back

That's the only way a military organization can

work," he said.(54)

Apparently the only concern expressed

at the meeting was how to get the general out of the mess
his statements had made.
On December 5, President Truman issued an order to
MacArthur requiring that all future public statements be
cleared through him to insure their compliance with
administration policy.
By the end of March 1951, the Truman administration
decided that the major objectives in Korea had been
achieved-the aggressor had been pushed back to his own
country, the United States and the United Nations had
demonstrated their determination, and the moral and
military strength of the Western allies had been
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significantly increased.(55)

When General MacArthur heard

that the president was preparing to announce truce
negotiations, he pre-empted the president with an
invitation to meet the enemy commander in the field and
discuss military means to end the war.

Worse yet,

MacArthur implied that refusal might mean expanding
hostilities to the Chinese homeland.
President Truman was irate, calling the invitation
an act totally disregarding all directives to abstain
from any declarations on foreign policy...a challenge
to the authority of the President under the Constitu
tion. It also flouted the policy of the United
Nations. By this act MacArthur left me no choice-I
could no longer tolerate his insubordination.(56)
The Joint Chiefs reprimanded MacArthur and demanded all
Communist peace offers be forwarded to Washington
immediately.
Within two weeks MacArthur angered the president even
more.

In a letter to Joseph W. Martin, the Republican

leader in the House, the general said,
It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that
here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have
elected to make their play for global conquest, and
that we have joined the issue thus raised on the
battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms
while the diplomats there still fight it with words;
that if we lose the war to Communism in Asia the fall
of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most
probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As
you point out, we must win. There is no substitute
for victory.(57)
This was the last straw for Truman who met with the Joint
Chiefs and his closest advisors on April 5th to draft orders
to relieve General MacArthur.

General Marshall wrote
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the order, and in a communications blunder, reporters got
hold of the text before it could be delivered to MacArthur.
The political consequences of that error made the order even
tougher on the president.
The disagreement between President Truman and General
MacArthur illustrates the complexity of the commander-in
chief role in the modern day.

MacArthur had a warrior

mind. He had been an Army officer for over 50 years and had
experienced four wars.

In 1931, he told a congressional

committee, "the objective of any warring nation is victory
immediate and complete."(58)

In Korea he rejected the idea

that force could be limited.

MacArthur saw war not as an

extension of politics, but rather a result of the breakdown
of politics.
Although MacArthur did not oppose the pre-war
abandonment of Korea, he did believe that once committed, he
must be allowed to win.

The general's philosophy of

fighting was that if a nation is not willing to make a total
commitment to its war effort, then it shouldn't fight at
all.
Truman saw his role as commander-in-chief quite
clearly.
He's the absolute commander of the armed forces
of the United States in time of war. He's the
commander of the armed forces when they're called
out for any purpose, if he wants to take control
of them. Nobody else can do it.(59)
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He realized that improvements in communications, alliances
and weaponry, especially nuclear weaponry, made the world a
much more complex place.

The concept of limited war was

here to stay, and with it increased control and
responsibility for the president.
As for why he fired MacArthur, Truman replies,
I fired him because he wouldn't respect the
authority of the President. That's the answer
to that. I didn't fire him because he was a
dumb son of a bitch, although he was, but
that's not against the law for generals. If
it was, half to three-quarters of them would
be in jail.(60)
Truman's relationship with MacArthur illustrates an
important lesson about the modern president's increased
responsibility as a military commander.

The necessity to

limit war in order to avoid nuclear war forces the
commander-in-chief to take a more active role in controlling
military operations.

Although it may be argued that

presidents have always had the power to command their forces
directly, the existence of nuclear weapons requires the
president to be actively involved in military operations.
Military leaders can no longer be trained to be concerned
only with victory in the classic sense.(61)

Limited war may

require a reasonable peace in order to prevent a major war.
MacArthur could never have accepted such an idea, but Harry
Truman realized that in an age of nuclear weapons, there
might not be able to be any clear cut winners.

The weapon
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designed to win a total war now served as the basis for a
new type of limited war.
The sharing of powers between the Congress and the
president regarding war powers had become even more complex.
By signing the United Nations charter, the United States
agreed to be an active player in world affairs.

Despite

historical traditions of isolationism, U.S. involvement in
the United Nations and development as a major economic power
forced an increased role for American military forces.
Control of these forces by civilian authority required some
agreement on the roles of the president and the Congress.
Although the administration had originally justified
its actions as within the constitutional powers of the
commander-in-chief, subsequent Congressional opposition
forced a fail-back position relying on American membership
and leadership in the United Nations.

The president now

had one more reason to exercise his commander-in-chief
powers with or without the consent of Congress.

CHAPTER III. EISENHOWER-MASSIVE RETALIATION STRATEGY
Although the Constitution holds the president
responsible for wartime decisions as commander-in-chief,
another concern of the founders appears to have been to
keep military men out of politics during peacetime.(62)

Up

until World War II, with limited exceptions, this desire
was met.

The United States never maintained large

peacetime armed forces and active soldiers and sailors
only occasionally were an important part of public life.
A unique characteristic of the American presidency
since the Second World War is that the president is almost
daily faced with issues which had once only been concerns
during wartime.

As such, it is natural that the

president's role as commander-in-chief should expand to
meet the needs of a constant state of emergency.

The world

faced by President Eisenhower was one of conflict or
potential conflict in multiple theaters, such as Central
America, the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, India,
southeast Asia, Japan, Korea, Africa, and central Europe.
Rather than study a particular event during the
Eisenhower administration, it is helpful to take a look at
the formulation of national defense strategy during that
period.

Although atomic weapons were developed and used

during the 1940s, no particular national defense strategy
was developed until the Eisenhower administration.

This is

due to the fact that the short peacetime period between
44
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World War II and Korea saw no rival to the 0.8. atomic
capability.

With a monopoly on atomic power, the United

States enjoyed no fear of attack from another nuclear
enemy.
The development of massive retaliation strategy is
important in the evolution of presidential war powers
because it was the first real American national military
strategy.

Prior to the nuclear age, American military

planners had done relatively insignificant exercises in
guessing who the next enemy might be and developing
contingency plans to deal with that threat.
From the broader view, it was natural that the
president and his staff have the role of developing
national military strategy.

After all, military commanders

are generally held accountable for strategic planning and
the president had already begun to take a more active part
as a military commander during the Truman administration.
In addition, massive retaliation strategy was as much a
foreign policy eis it was a military strategy.

The threat

of U.S. nuclear attack was to serve as a deterrent to
Soviet activity running contrary to American interests.
Foreign policy planning was certainly in the domain of the
president and the State Department.
What is less natural is that the Congress appeared to
have little interest in a national military strategy even
though the existence of large standing military forces
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during peacetime was unprecedented and would be a
significant strain on the federal budget.

The founders'

fear of a militarily strong executive seems to have
disappeared by 1953.
We have already seen how a fear of atomic weapons
limited the conduct of the war in Korea.

The 1950s brought

much more emphasis on the Cold War and how nuclear weapons
might be employed in that type of "engagement."

A second

concern was the typical American tendency to disband
considerable numbers of military forces in the absence of a
hot war.

A need for constant military readiness in a

peacetime environment posed a new and unique problem to the
Eisenhower administration.
When Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected president, the
Soviet Union had already exploded its first atomic bomb on
September 24, 1949.

Soon after Ike took office, the

Soviets tested their first hydrogen bomb on August 12,
1953.

Shortly after the H-bomb test, the U.S. Atomic

Energy Commission announced that the USSR had begun tests
of tactical nuclear weapons.

Although America still had

the edge in weapon technology and delivery systems, it was
clear to the administration that a new threat existed which
would demand constant readiness on the part of American
armed forces.
President Truman's Air Policy Commission had reported
in December 1947 that the USSR could obtain "substantial
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quantities" of atomic weapons within five years and
concluded:
This means that the traditional peacetime strategy
of the United States must be changed radically. We
can no longer count on having our cities and the
rest of our mainland untouched in a future war...
We must count on our homeland becoming increasingly
vulnerable as the weapons increase in destructiveness
and the means of delivering them are improved.(63)
The Commission's prediction had come true.

Despite a lack

of accurate delivery vehicles that would not be disclosed
until much later, the Soviets now had the capability to
strike at the American homeland with little or no warning,
a capability that no other nation had ever had before in
U.S. history.
Besides the military threat, the Eisenhower
administration had to deal with two problems left over from
the Truman presidency.

The country was disenchanted with

the concept of limited war as it was carried out in Korea,
and the resources required to fight the Korean War had
placed a heavy burden on the American economy.(64)

The

search was on to find a defense strategy that would provide
for the nation's defense needs, but reduce the economic
burdens of maintaining large peacetime forces.
What resulted became known as the New Look policy or
the "long haul" concept.(65)

Secretary of State John

Poster Dulles outlined the policy in a speech to the
Council on Foreign Relations on January 12, 1954.

Dulles

recognized the burdens of an emergency mentality and said
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that the cost and reactionary nature of emergency measures
could not be depended on as a permanent policy.
The administration defined the threat as Communist
ideology.

Assumptions based on that threat were that the

Soviet Union could never really live in peace alongside
free nations and that international security would remain
threatened by Communism as long as ideology remained
unchanged.(66)

In addition, the United States had stated

that Communism was a totally unacceptable way of life.
Therefore, any military strategy designed to meet the
threat must be inherently flexible, in order to meet the
demands of the rigid economic and political framework
imposed on military strategy by a democratic way of
life.(67)
Dulles underscored the need for a maximum deterrent at
an acceptable cost:
We want, for ourselves and the other free nations,
a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost.
Local defense will always be important. But there
is no local defense which alone will contain the
mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local
defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent
of massive retaliatory power. A potential
aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe
battle conditions that suit him...
The way to deter aggression is for the free
community to be willing and able to respond
vigorously at places and with means of its own
choosing.(64)
The Secretary actually discussed the nature of the threat
and massive retaliation strategy as early as May 1952 in an
article for Life magazine entitled "A Policy of
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Boldness."(68)

He described a united Soviet and Chinese

army of 3-4 million men threatening 20 nations over a
20,000 mile boundary.
Dulles accurately pointed out that current or
projected U.S. forces failed to meet that threat by a wide
margin.

The only solution, then, was to design a force

that could retaliate instantly in a place where it would
hurt the enemy at times of our own choosing.
The Eisenhower administration determined that nuclear
weapons were the answer to the defense problem.

Long-range

strategic nuclear forces would provide the core of the
country's defense forces and serve as the overall
deterrent.

Shorter range tactical nuclear weapons would

provide greater local firepower and thus, a smaller need
for large conventional armies.
Massive retaliation policy has a number of meanings,
all of which were mentioned by the Eisenhower
administration over the course of its eight years in
office.(69)

First is the concept of deterrence.

Basically

deterrence strategy means that our reaction to moves of an
aggressor become so costly to that aggressor that he no
longer can see the benefit in carrying out an aggressive
policy.

Massive retaliation strategy left no question that

the United States would react as it saw fit in times and
places of its own choosing with means of its own choosing
up to and including the use of strategic nuclear weapons.
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Eisenhower's advisors sought to keep the Communist world
guessing by never stating when a nuclear response would be
appropriate or if an enemy's military bases or cities would
be held at risk.(70)
The second meaning of massive retaliation strategy is
that selected acts of aggression can quickly be expanded
beyond the desires of the aggressor.

Eisenhower sent the

message that the United States would no longer feel the
need to limit itself the way it had in Korea.

Dulles

specifically referred to the limitations on the doctrine of
"hot pursuit" used to prevent U.S. fighter aircraft from
chasing down North Korean and Chinese MiGs into Chinese
airspace.(71)

Because of this self-imposed restriction,

Dulles explained, the enemy was able to execute a
successful campaign against UN forces and exploit the
weakness created by the restriction.

This success resulted

in unneeded waste of lives among UN forces and delayed
successful prosecution of the war.

Such self-imposed

restrictions were no longer to be a part of American
strategy.
A third meaning of the Eisenhower policy was that the
U.S. now had the ability to strike at the so-called silent
aggressor.

Actual combatants were no longer the only

possible targets of a retaliatory strike.

If the United

States had sufficient evidence of an enemy acting as a
supplier or an instigator in some aggressive act, we would
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hold them responsible for that attack and respond in a way
we found appropriate.
Lastly, the massive retaliation doctrine implied that
an actual attack on the United States or its vital
interests would result in a massive counterattack
destroying all of an aggressor's warmaking capabilities.
Such a policy would make any thought of attack against the
United States too costly to consider seriously.
According to a presidential budget message, the
primary mission assigned to U.S. forces "is to maintain
ready nuclear-air-retaliatory forces so strong that they
will deter a potential aggressor from initiating an
attack."(72)

National defense priorities in order of

precedence became deterrence, continental defense, and
actual combat operations.
The defense budget and procurement goal was to avoid a
series of peaks and valleys.

There was no time set to have

U.S. capabilities reach a peak.

According to Paul Peeters,

"any attempt to establish some date of maximum danger is
futile."(73)

Slow steady growth using cheaper nuclear

weaponry over large manpower accounts would insure adequate
defense capability while promoting a strong economy.
As Soviet nuclear capabilities continued to increase
through the 1950s, the administration's reliance on nuclear
weapons began to come into question.

The theme most

undermining the credibility of the strategy was reliance on
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tactical nuclear weapons in a small conventional scenario
with a Soviet foe capable of quickly accelerating the
conflict to streitegic nuclear exchanges. (74)
In response to this criticism, the administration now
played a game of what became called "brinksmanship."

The

U.S. would continue to be willing to retaliate with nuclear
weapons if necessary to defend important interests.

Now

the U.S. would even be willing to risk mutual destruction
in order to maintain deterrence.

This concept eventually

became known as mutual assured destruction or MAD and has
served as the core of strategic nuclear policy ever since.
An interesting observation is that Congress never
attempted to take an active role in U.S. nuclear strategy.
Perhaps rightly so, the president exercised his authority
as commander-in-chief of the armed forces to develop a
strategy for the use of his forces.

The real concern of

the Congress at this time was not military strategy.
all, the country was not at war.

After

Congressional concern

centered around getting the economy under control by
reducing defense spending.

Nuclear weapons were a

conveniently cheap way to show an attempt at defense while
reducing the budget through manpower cuts.

Since massive

retaliation strategy served the defense needs of the
commander-in-chief and the economic needs of the Congress,
little disagreement was voiced between the executive and
the legislature.
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While massive retaliation strategy can arguably
account for a prompt end to the Korean War out of a fear of
a U.S. nuclear strike, a number of events throughout
President Eisenhower's two terms showed the weaknesses of
the strategy.

Inadequate responses to these events raised

doubts by both Republicans and Democrats about the
presidency itself, and whether the president and the
commander-in-chief could continue to be one person.(75)
The first crisis concerned the Viet Minh attack on
French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

President

Eisenhower originally spoke of the event as the Korea of
Indochina.

On April 7th, he gave his famous "domino

theory" speech, implying that a communist victory would
lead to other communist victories in surrounding areas.

He

approved a National Security Council recommendation for
limited U.S. intervention, but was publicly embarrassed
when General Ridgway informed him that American troop
strength and transport capability were inadequate for the
task.

Moreover, a call-up of national guard and reserve

forces at least as large as the Korean build-up of 1950-51
would be required even for a limited involvement.(75)

The

president's hesitation sent a message to the Viet Minh that
the U.S. might not consider their attack to be such a high
priority.
As open revolt broke out in Hungary in 1956, an
opportunity to exercise U.S. policy again came about.

With
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the threat of a full-scale nuclear confrontation with the
USSR in the back of his mind, President Eisenhower again
backed down from direct confrontation.

Despite earlier

encouragement for such rebellion through Radio Free Europe
and other propaganda vehicles, the most the United States
could offer the rebels was a word of support along with
food and Red Cross supplies.(76)
October 4, 1957 brought the shocking news that the
Soviets had launched the world's first satellite, Sputnik
I.

Immediately, superior Soviet capabilities in the rocket

(and therefore nuclear delivery) business were evident.
The United States now had a questionable ability to carry
out massive retaliation strategy even if it wanted to.
Middle Eastern crises returned in the summer of 1958.
Egypt absorbed Syria, forming the United Arab Republic with
the goal of uniting all Arab nations in the region.

The

U.S. feared the threat to the young nation of Israel and
suspected Soviet assistance in the effort. (77)
Lebanon complained of border intrusions by the UAR
designed to upset dissident groups and topple the Lebanese
government.

On July 16th, President Eisenhower ordered

Marines into Lebanon without consulting Congress or
referring to a 1957 resolution of support by the Congress.
The Marines' goal was to protect the 2500 Americans in
Lebanon and assist the Lebanese government in maintaining
its sovereignty.
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The president explained,
I have come to the sober and clear conclusion that
the action taken was essential to the welfare of
the United States. It was required to support the
principles of justice upon which peace and a stable
international order depend.(78)
Similarly, the president single-handedly approved U-2
overflights of the Soviet Union in order to gain
intelligence information from aerial photography.

In the

spring of 1960, word of the overflights became public when
Soviet air defenses shot down Francis Gary Powers who was
flying a U-2 on a reconnaissance mission.

Initially, the

State Department and NASA issued statements that the
shoot-down must have been a weather aircraft operating out
of Turkey.

They claimed the pilot must have suffered

oxygen deficit loss of consciousness due to cabin pressure
loss and strayed over Soviet territory when automatic
systems took over.(79)
When Khrushchev announced the plane had crashed 1200
miles inside Soviet borders near Sverdlovsk, administration
credibility was damaged.

In addition, the aircraft had

been recovered and identified as a U-2 with reconnaissance
camera equipment on board.

The pilot also had been

equipped with a poison "suicide needle," hardly standard
issue for a weather mission.
Finally, the administration admitted the president had
authorized the flights which had begun several years
before.

The details of each flight, however, had not been
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a presidential concern.

In the June 6, 1960 State

Department Bulletin, the president explained,
It is part of my grave responsibility, within the
overall problem of protecting the American people,
to guard ourselves and our allies against surprise
attack...as commander-in-chief, charged with the
direction of the operations and activities of our
armed forces and their supporting services, I take
full responsibility for approving all the various
programs undertaken by our government to secure and
evaluate military intelligence.(80)
Despite these lone actions by the president acting as
commander-in-chief, Eisenhower never really tried to expand
his role as commander-in-chief.

If anything, he attempted

to temper the precedents set by Truman by asking for
Congressional resolutions of support in most circumstances
and by limiting the military budget to promote the general
welfare of the economy.
The president's attempts, however, were just that.
The demands of the cold war and the increasing complexity
of American responsibility around the world did increase
the president's power to pursue foreign relations and act
in the role of commander-in-chief.

As Robinson points out,

"the President himself, whether or not he wanted to be, had
become a world leader."(81)

Dealing with the inadequacies

of massive retaliation strategy would fall upon the
shoulders of the next administration.
If Congress was interested in maintaining its share of
the war powers, it was strangely silent.

Although the

president had some difficulty adjusting to his increased
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responsibilities, the Congress lagged further behind in
recognizing the new position of the United States in world
leadership.

This lag continued well into the Vietnam

conflict and allowed for continuing expansion of power by
the president as commander-in-chief.

CHAPTER IV. KENNEDY-THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
When Senator John F. Kennedy ran for president
against Vice President Richard Nixon in I960, much of the
Democratic position rested on the idea that the Eisenhower
administration had been weak on defense issues.

Kennedy

pointed out the weaknesses in massive retaliation policy,
showing that any challenge to American determination would
have to be met with grave decisions about the fate of the
civilized world unless the United States had some more
flexible defense capabilities than nuclear weapons.

The

Kennedy administration, therefore took office calling for a
new strategy, known as flexible response, where the United
States would still be able to respond to aggression with
nuclear weapons; but now we would also be able to respond
to lesser acts of aggression in the Third World with
conventional forces.

This new strategy would require

considerably larger defense forces than were in existence
in 1960.

While the buildup took place, Kennedy would have

to deal with the weaknesses of massive retaliation
strategy.
Perhaps the biggest challenge to American
determination and the best example of the complexities of
nuclear superpower relations is Kennedy's handling of the
Cuban missile crisis.

The details of this crisis make a

case for strong presidential leadership and the inability
of a large group (like Congress) to make important timely
58
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decisions concerning national defense.

On the other hand,

had the president handled the situation poorly, it would be
just as easy to make the case that one person can not and
should not be entrusted with ultimate war powers.
The missile crisis is important because it built
Congressional and public confidence in the president's
ability to act properly as the commander-in-chief without
consulting Congress until the crisis was over.

It is also

unique because it is the first time that brinksmanship was
truly put to the test.

The seriousness of the modern

president's commander-in-chief role was confirmed.
As Lester Brune points out, the success of deterrence
depends on understanding how an enemy will act in a
crisis.(82)

With this in mind, it is helpful to look at

the series of events leading up to the missile crisis of
October, 1962.

U.S. strategy was in a state of change and

President Kennedy was underestimated by the Soviet
leadership.
Remembering that JFK's presidential campaign rested on
the idea that the Eisenhower administration had been weak
on defense and reliant on an unrealistic strategy, it is
easy to understand why Kennedy resorted to much more
confrontational Cold War tactics once he took office.

His

ordering of the Bay of Pigs invasion as well as developing
American policy in the Congo, Berlin, and Vietnam indicated
Kennedy's willingness to be more aggressive with the
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Kremlin.(83)

The administration program also included a

healthy build-up of conventional military forces to offset
the weaknesses of relying on strategic nuclear weapons.
In a special message to Congress on defense policies
and principles on March 28, 1961, President Kennedy
declared:
Our arms must be adequate to meet our commitments and
insure our security, without being bound by arbitrary
budget ceilings. This nation can afford to be strongit cannot afford to be weak... Our strategic arms and
defenses must be adequate to deter any deliberate
nuclear attack on the United States or our alliesby making clear to any potential aggressor that
sufficient retaliatory forces will be able to survive
a first strike and penetrate his defenses in order to
inflict unacceptable losses upon him... The strength
and deployment of our forces in combination with
those of our allies should be sufficiently powerful
and mobile to prevent the steady erosion of the Free
World through limited wars; and it is this role that
should constitute the primary mission of our overseas
forces... our objective now is to increase our ability
to confine our response to non-nuclear weapons, and to
lessen the incentive for any limited aggression by
making clear what our response will accomplish.(84)
Kennedy's initial failure at the Bay of Pigs and his
failure to impress Chairman Khrushchev at their first
meeting led to a Soviet miscalculation of American
determination and capabilities.

A complicating factor was

a differing definition of offensive and defensive nuclear
weapons between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.(83)
In early 1962, the Soviet Presidium decided to place
Medium Range and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(MRBM/ICBM) in Cuba.

Brune claims the decision was made in
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order to test Kennedy's will and protect Cuba against the
threat of an American invasion.(85)
Meanwhile, the United States was still recovering from
the idea of a "missile gap" which had become a popular
notion after the 1957 Sputnik launch.

President Eisenhower

always maintained that no such gap existed, but his critics
won out in the public opinion polls.

Although the

president was ultimately correct, and no missile gap ever
really existed, his critics won by stating potential
numbers of Soviet missiles rather than the numbers actually
produced.

Eisenhower also counted American strategic

bombers in his evaluation while the missile gap proponents
counted only numbers of ICBMs.
After taking office in early 1961, Kennedy quickly had
access to Eisenhower's data and realized the missile gap
really did not exist.

We are left to wonder whether

President Kennedy really already knew that no missile gap
existed, but rode the tide of public opinion to attack the
Eisenhower/Nixon record.

Secret U-2 aerial photography

indicated that the U.S. was still well ahead of the Soviets
in strategic nuclear arms.(86)

By late 1961, the president

decided to publicly disclose the Soviet inadequacies.
It is now clear that Khrushchev wanted to make every
effort to establish strategic parity with the United
States.

He was supported in that effort by S.S. Biryuzov,

commander of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces.

Biryuzov
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called for Cuban based missiles to offset a perceived
first-strike capability by the United States.(87)
The U.S.S.R. steadily increased economic aid to Castro
from 1960 to 1962.

Khrushchev first suggested Soviet

military protection for Cuba on July 9, 1962.

He told

Castro, "Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people
with their rocket fire" and Soviet missiles could "land
precisely on targets 13,000 kilometers away."(88)

Later

that month, Castro announced that the Soviets showed a new
commitment to deter or repel a U.S. attack.
President Kennedy never agreed to abandon Cuba to
communism.

Falling back on the Monroe Doctrine, he said,

"I want it clearly understood that this government will not
hesitate in meeting its primary obligations" to ensure the
nation's security.(89)
On July 12th, Khrushchev made a statement that the
Monroe Doctrine could no longer be valid, and that the
United States was merely relying on an outdated concept to
project its control over Latin America.

Additionally,

restrictions on Soviet activities in the western hemisphere
were not balanced with similar restrictions on American
activities in Europe.
By August, the Central Intelligence Agency, through
U-2 overflights, had confirmed the presence of new
Surface-to-Air missile sites in Cuba.
not to act.

The president chose

Republican criticism from Congress immediately
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began to mount.

Interestingly, the two parties had changed

positions on who was "weak on defense."
By September 4th, the president felt the need to
publicly answer the criticism from the minority party in
Congress.

Kennedy made statements on September 4th and

September 13th claiming there was no evidence of Soviet
offensive weapons in Cuba.

Since SAMs were purely

defensive in nature, the administration chose to do nothing
while assuring the public and the Congress that it would be
willing to do whatever was necessary to protect American
security if offensive missiles were ever discovered.(90)
Also in early September, Secretary of State Dean Rusk
convinced the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance to stop
flights over Cuba after China shot down a U-2 loaned to
Formosa.

He did not want to have a repeat of the Powers

incident in Cuba.

The Director of Central Intelligence was

on his honeymoon at the time and therefore was not present
to oppose the Secretary.

As a result, no reconnaissance

flights were flown over Cuba from September 10th until
October 14th.
Upon his return, Director McCone directed resumption
of U-2 overflights of Cuba.

The first flight on October

14th found evidence of Soviet missile site
construction.(91)
McGeorge Bundy informed the president of the discovery
of MRBM construction in Cuba early on the morning of
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Tuesday, October 16th.

Kennedy immediately called for an

11:45 am secret meeting of the Executive Committee of the
National Security Council.

Attendees were to be Vice

President Johnson, Secretary of State Rush, Secretary of
Defense McNamara, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Generals
Taylor and Carter, Roswell Gilpatric, George Ball, Edwin
Martin, McGeorge Bundy, Ted Sorenson, Douglas Dillon,
Ambassador Bohlen and Appointments Secretary Kenneth
O'Donnell.(92)

This first meeting dismissed the "do

nothing" alternative as a nullification of the Monroe
Doctrine and the Rio Treaty.

The first decision would be

an increase in U-2 activity and no public comment until a
solution was chosen.
The president decided to maintain his normal schedule
while allowing his brother, the Attorney General, to run
the ExComm meetings.

This would avoid the public

perception that something out of the ordinary might be
going on.

Kennedy also recognized an important element of

decision making.

Since his presence might stifle creative

thinking and pressure ExComm members to give the answer
they felt the president wanted, the president decided not
to attend many of the ExComm meetings.

Even when he did

attend, his brother claims he played the role of devil's
advocate rather than taking a position.(93)
Elie Abel describes the first six options considered
by the ExComm on October 17th.

Three options were proposed
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by the diplomats and three were proposed by the military
members.

Track A was to take no immediate action. The

administration would privately confront Andrei Gromyko with
the U-2 photos.
Track B was to send an emissary to Khrushchev to
privately demand removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba.
Track C would be to arraign the U.S.S.R. and Cuba before
the United Nations Security Council.
Each of the three diplomatic proposals had weaknesses
that led to their dismissal.

Track A was rejected because

it would give the Soviets advance warning before any public
pressure could be brought to bear on them.

Track B could

be hazardous because it could be countered by a Soviet
initiative similar to the Munich conference.

Finally,

Track C was unacceptable because of Soviet veto power on
the Security Council and the Soviets' turn to chair that
body during the month of October.
The military proposals were labelled Tracks D, E, and
F.

Track D, favored strongly by Secretary of Defense

McNamara, was an embargo and naval blockade of Cuba.

This

would be the "slow track" which could be selective and
easily controlled in relation to an armed attack.
Track E was favored by Air Force generals and
consisted of a pinpoint bombing attack on the missile
sites.

Concerns here included casualties, accuracy and

retaliation.
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Track F was the most drastic proposal— an all out
invasion of Cuba.

Problems with this proposal were the

time needed to mount the offensive and the difficulty in
concealing plans for such a large operation.(94)
On October 18th, the ExComm split into two "teams" to
debate the only remaining options seen as realistic.

The

air strike and blockade options were sent through a war
games type exercise to find weaknesses.

By this time, new

intelligence estimates indicated half of the current Soviet
ICBH capacity being installed in Cuba.
McNamara advocated the blockade option because of its
controllability and flexibility while Air Force Chief of
Staff General Curtis LeMay pushed for a surgical air strike
to eliminate the missiles before they could become a
threat.

His worry was that once operational capability was

achieved, any misses in a later strike might result in
instant nuclear retaliation against the United States.

The

president was called in at 10:00pm, and according to his
brother, was initially in favor of the air strike
option.(95)
President Kennedy was initially opposed by UN
ambassador Stevenson who suggested giving up missiles in
Turkey and Italy and the naval base at Guantanamo Bay in
exchange for the Soviets removing the missiles from Cuba.
An interesting point is that the president had ordered the
older missile systems removed from Turkey in the spring of
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1962, but bureaucratic inertia prevented their removal.
Now they appeared to be becoming an important bargaining
chip with the Soviets.
Abel says,
The President alone, as Commander in Chief, had the
power to decide and did in fact give the orders. The
President's was the controlling intelligence. He ran
the operation, one official recalls, "like a
lieutenant runs a platoon in combat." Bundy, Rusk,
Stevenson, and the rest were there to advise him. He
listened, then made his own decisions.(96)
The ultimate policy objective was to remove the Soviet
missiles from Cuba or get rid of Castro.

With the Bay of

Pigs humiliation in the back of his mind, the president
chose the blockade plan, with the option to carry out air
strikes or an invasion at a later date.

Ted Sorenson was

assigned to write the president's announcement.
The final plan had seven steps.
quarantine.

First was the naval

It would not be like the 1948 Berlin Blockade

because only offensive weapons shipments would be turned
back.
The second step was continued close surveillance of
activities on Cuba.

Cubans and Soviets at the sites would

be warned of possible danger from attack.
The U.S. would promise instant retaliation in the
event of any launch of missiles from Cuba.

This

retaliation would be aimed at the Soviet homeland.
Next, Navy dependents were to be evacuated from
Guantanamo Bay and the base was to be reinforced in case of
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hostile action by the Cubans.
be taken.

Diplomatic action would also

The U.S. called a meeting of the Organization of

American States to invoke the Rio Treaty.
The United States also called an emergency meeting of
the United Nations Security Council to call for a
resolution ordering the U.S.S.R. to dismantle and remove
all offensive missiles from Cuba.
Lastly, there would be a personal appeal to reason.
The president would call on Chairman Khrushchev to support
world peace.(97)

The president went on national television

the night of October 22nd to outline the plan for the
American people and the world.(98)

Before his speech,

however, the president wrote a letter to Khrushchev which
would become the first of a daily series of written
communications between the two leaders.
The ExComm did address the question of the president's
powers as commander-in-chief.

It pondered the idea of

calling on Congress to ask for a declaration of war on
Cuba.

Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson advised the

president not to worry about legal formalities because
American security was at stake.

His advice sounds

remarkably similar to the advice he gave President Truman
after the North Korean invasion.

This is a key point about

how presidential war powers had evolved up until then.
Acheson and all those who went along with his advice
believed that the law did not apply to the president in
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times when the national security was at stake.

As long as

the president is making decisions that are publicly
popular, this concept of presidential power might be fairly
easy to accept.

However, as the nation would find out by

experiencing the next two presidents, the idea of
unrestricted presidential power during emergencies sets a
dangerous precedent for accumulation of personal power.
By basically sitting idle during the ever increasing number
of national emergencies, Congress helped set the stage for
the major conflict over the "imperial presidency" in the
early 1970s.
President Kennedy apparently did reject all ideas of
recalling Congress or asking for a declaration of war.

He

directed the blockade "acting under and by virtue of the
authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and
statutes of the United States Congress and the Organ of
Consultation of the American Republics and to defend the
security of the United States..."(99)

The Congressional

resolution Kennedy referred to was one passed in September,
1962, calling for any means necessary to prevent Cuba from
extending subversive activities throughout the western
hemisphere or from creating or using any military capacity
threatening to the United States.
The full cabinet and Congressional leaders were not
informed of the complete plan until three hours before the
president's television address.

Some tension did develop
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among members of Congress, but overall, the response was
supportive of the president.

Senators Russell and

Fulbright were not satisfied with the blockade and called
for an invasion of Cuba.

When Fulbright was questioned

about how he could oppose the Bay of Pigs invasion yet
favor an invasion now, he responded that the Bay of Pigs
was not a critical event, but deployment of Soviet missiles
was.
Representative Halleck represented the Republican
minority point of view by stating that he supported the
actions of the president but was disappointed that he was
only informed, not consulted about U.S. military plans.
This viewpoint was expressed, but never very loudly with
the threat of a nuclear war bearing more on the public mind
than a constitutional issue.(100)
Answering later charges that Congressional
consultation may have been necessary, President Kennedy
answered,
We no longer live in a world where only the actual
firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge
to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril.
Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic
missiles are so swift that any substantially increased
possibility of their use or any sudden change in their
deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat
to peace.(101)
The president seems to have been equating presidential
action concerning nuclear weapons with an imminent threat
to the people and/or property of the United States.

If

this is accepted as true, he was really doing nothing more
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than exercising presidential power recognized since the
founding fathers.

What really had changed was the concept

of "imminent threat."

With the minimum response time

available under nuclear attach, the president could now
argue that an imminent threat to the United States existed
on a day to day basis.

While his "list of powers" did not

change much, the implications of presidential action
regarding nuclear weapons and the frequency of such actions
now gave the president opportunity to exercise war powers
on a scale never imagined by the founding fathers.
At 7:00 am on Friday, October 26th, the U.S. Navy
stopped and boarded the first vessel headed for Cuba.

The

vessel was the Marucla, an American built Liberty ship
owned by Panama, registered in Lebanon, and bound for Cuba
under Soviet charter.

President Kennedy personally

selected the Marucla as the first ship to be boarded
because it wasn't Soviet owned.

At this late hour he still

tried to reduce the conflict by choosing a chartered
vessel, but he felt it important to demonstrate American
resolve.

At 7:24 am, crewmen from the destroyers John

Pierce and Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. boarded the Marucla.
found no weapons and encountered no problems with the
vessel's crew.
The president ordered increased reconnaissance
overflight activity.

The sortie rate increased from two

per day to one flight every one to two hours.

This
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photographic information would be critical to the
president's decision about whether or not to order an air
strike on the missile sites.
Later Friday morning, President Kennedy ordered the
State Department to prepare for an occupation government in
case of an American invasion.

Again, Secretary McNamara

reminded him, "we should expect very heavy casualties in an
invasion."(102)
Meanwhile, Secretary McNamara was leading the blockade
effort.

According to Elie Abel,

Methodically the Secretary of Defense quizzed the
Chief of Naval Operations about details— the kinds of
details, Navy men insist, that civilians have no
business worrying about. No Secretary of Defense had
ever spoken that way to a member of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. He asked whether there was a Russianspeaking officer on each blockading destroyer.
Anderson confessed he did not know. Then find out,
McNamara said. (In fact the Navy had foreseen this
need and, among others, had assigned several Annapolis
language instructors to blockade duty.) (103)
Attorney General Robert Kennedy pointed out that the
President felt compelled to supervise every detail.

He was

concerned with medical personnel, electronic intelligence,
leaflet drops, and the ships to be used for the
invasion.(104)

Apparently, the president felt his duties

as commander-in-chief required this attention to the many
details of the operation.
On October 25th, Walter Lippmann had appealed to
President Kennedy to trade American IRBM sites in Turkey
for the Soviet missile sites in Cuba.

Lippmann argued

73

these sites were defenseless and militarily unimportant to
the United States.

He stressed the need to continue

diplomatic efforts despite initiation of military action.
He did not know that the president had already considered
all these points and indeed was quietly pursuing diplomatic
solutions through his daily correspondence with Chairman
Khrushchev.
At 6:00pm on Friday evening, the 26th, Khrushchev's
most revealing letter of the crisis arrived at the White
House.

Robert Kennedy points out that much has been

written about this letter, but it was clearly a personal
message from the chairman not written by Kremlin
officials.(104)

The letter was very long and focused on

death and anarchy that would result from a nuclear
exchange.

Clearly, Kennedy's resolve was very real to

Khrushchev.
Khrushchev sought to calm the president by assuring
him that Soviet missiles in Cuba would never be used to
attack the United States.

They were present only for

defensive purposes.
You can be calm in this regard, that we are of sound
mind and understand perfectly well that if we attack
you, you will respond the same way. But you too will
receive the same that you hurl against us. And I
think that you also understand this...This indicates
that we are normal people, that we correctly
understand and correctly evaluate the situation.
Consequently, how can we permit the incorrect actions
which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics or suicides,
who themselves want to perish and to destroy the whole
world before they die, could do this.
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We want something quite different...not to destroy
your country...but despite our ideological
differences, to compete peacefully, not by military
means.(105)
Khrushchev also acknowledged that all planned missile
shipments were already in Cuba, so there was no need to
stop ships currently proceeding to Cuba.

He explained that

the USSR had placed them there because they felt a U.S.
interest in overthrowing Castro.

The missiles were merely

a means to help the Castro government defend itself by
providing a deterrent to an American invasion.
Khrushchev's proposal came down to this:

The United

States promises not to invade Cuba and withdraws the
blockade in exchange for the removal or destruction of
missiles in Cuba and the curtailment of any further missile
shipments to Cuba from the Soviet Union.
Developments came rapidly the morning of Saturday
October 27th.

FBI director J. Edgar Hoover submitted a

report to the president indicating Soviet personnel in New
York were destroying sensitive documents in preparation for
war.

A second letter from Khrushchev arrived with a much

more formal tone.

Obviously, this letter had been prepared

by other Kremlin officials.

It included a demand that

American missiles in Turkey be removed in exchange for
Soviet missiles in Cuba.
The Attorney General reports that the ExComm met again
to consider the Soviet proposal.

Although the president

was angry about his earlier orders to remove missiles from
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Turkey being ignored, the ExComm found the Soviet offer
reasonable with no projected loss to U.S. or NATO
capabilities.(106)
Later that morning, word reached the president that
Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr. was shot down and killed by a
Soviet surface-to-air missile while on a U-2 reconnaissance
mission over Cuba.

President Kennedy expressed concern

about further U-2 flights with the continued SAM threat.
Despite his concern, the president restrained his call for
an attack.
It is isn't the first step that concerns me, but both
sides escalating to the fourth and fifth step— and we
don't go to the sixth because there is no one around
to do so. We must remind ourselves we are embarking
on a very hazardous course.
He also was worried about other parts of the world.

His

next question was whether areas like Berlin or Turkey
should be notified of a potential war.(107)
Robert Kennedy remembered,
These hourly decisions, necessarily made with such
rapidity, could be made only by the President of the
United states, but any one of them might close and
lock doors for people and governments in many other
lands. We had to be aware of this responsibility at
all times, he said, aware that we were deciding, the
President was deciding, for the U.S., the Soviet
Union, Turkey, NATO, and really for all
mankind...(107)
President Kennedy decided to try one more letter to
Khrushchev.

The State Department's draft bluntly said "no

trades," but the Attorney General and Ted Sorenson believed
the State Department's tone was too harsh.

They encouraged

76

the president to accept the Soviet offer as it did not
damage American security and achieved our policy
objectives.

At the president's request, Kennedy and

Sorenson drew up an alternate response.

Their version

provided general acceptance of the Soviet proposal, but did
not directly offer to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey.
This allowed the president to compromise with Khrushchev
without appearing to have backed down.

President Kennedy

accepted the alternate response and signed the text.
On Sunday, October 28th, the president issued a public
statement.
I welcome Chairman Khrushchev's statesmanlike decision
to stop building bases in Cuba, dismantling offensive
weapons and returning them to the Soviet Union under
United Nations verification. This is an important and
constructive contribution to peace.
We shall be in touch with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations with respect to reciprocal measures to
assure peace in the Caribbean area.
It is my earnest hope that the governments of the
world can, with a solution of the Cuban crisis, turn
their attention to the compelling necessity for ending
the arms race and reducing world tensions. This
applies to the military confrontation between the
Warsaw Pact and NATO countries as well as to other
situations in other parts of the world where tensions
lead to the wasteful diversion of resources to weapons
of war.(108)
Because the president was killed a year after the
Cuban missile crisis, he had little chance to reflect on
the lessons learned from it.

In an address at American

University in Washington, D.C. on June 10, 1963, President
Kennedy said,
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Above all, while defending our own vital interests,
nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which
bring an adversary to the choice of either a
humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.(109)
In his memoirs, Robert Kennedy reflected at length
about the lessons of the Cuban missile crisis.

He

summarizes the key lesson as providing enough time for a
variety of departmental interests to work in private to
develop a realistic set of options for the president.

An

important corollary is to avoid too much respect and awe
for the president.

Often subordinates are more concerned

with what the leader wants to hear than they are with the
best solution to the problem.
In this case, President Kennedy went to extraordinary
lengths to avoid insulation from ideas because of some
notion of rank or position.

He also allowed the ExComm to

work without him to avoid his own influence on their
decision making.

However, in the end, the president

realized his responsibility as commander-in-chief to make
the final decision.
I think this was more necessary in the military field
than any other. President Kennedy was impressed with
the effort and dedicated manner in which the military
responded— the Navy deploying its vessels into the
Caribbean; the Air Force going on continuous alert;
the Army and Marines moving their soldiers and
equipment into the southeastern part of the U.S.; and
all of them alert and ready for combat.
But he was distressed that the representatives with
whom he met, with the notable exception of General
Taylor, seemed to give so little consideration to the
implications of steps they suggested.(110)
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While Kennedy concluded an important need existed for
civilian control over those dedicating their lives to
waging war, he did express a larger fear for those few
generals who always sought to avoid military action.

In

the president's view, generals and admirals should always
advocate military solutions.

This provides one side of the

argument needed for good decision making.

Perhaps he would

liked to have talked with President Lincoln about his
experiences with McClellan and the Army of the Potomac.
The handling of the Cuban missile crisis was certainly
a success for President Kennedy.

It does point out the

need to have one solid decision maker in the midst of a
national security crisis.

It also illustrated the point

that imminent danger to national security exists in day to
day activities when large nuclear arsenals are present.

A

lack of congressional involvement in such a situation was
not unusual, but the day to day presence of nuclear weapons
provides more opportunities for the president to act alone
as the commander-in-chief.

CHAPTER V. JOHNSON-THE GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION
Through the early 1960s, we have seen the development
of the president's commander-in-chief role in terms of a
new concept of limited war, national strategy with a
monopoly on strategic nuclear weapons, and confrontation
with a nuclear enemy approaching parity.

All of these

situations reflect a general reluctance on the part of
Congress to interfere with an increasing presence by the
chief executive as commander-in-chief.
The Johnson administration reflects a continuation of
a trend of increasing presidential power, but provides a
case indicating the beginnings of congressional opposition
to this power.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution represents

many aspects of the Johnson presidency.

It indicates a

congressional trust in the judgment of the president with
respect to war making, justification of massive build-up of
American involvement in Vietnam, and the beginning of a
movement to reassert the power of Congress with respect to
the war powers, culminating in the War Powers Resolution of
1973 during the Nixon administration.
When Lyndon Johnson took office in 1963, nearly 17,000
American troops were in Vietnam, most in an advisory
capacity.

American involvement in the region began as long

ago as the Truman administration, when 35 American advisers
were sent.

By the end of the Eisenhower years, about 100

military advisers were in South Vietnam playing a small
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part in resisting the Viet Minh, a role abandoned by the
French in 1954.

A rapid build-up occurred during the

Kennedy administration when the president viewed American
military involvement as critical to the survival of South
Vietnam.
As with most domestic and foreign aspects of the
Johnson presidency, the war in Vietnam became an expansion
of what began under President Kennedy.

The war would

become America's longest war, and one of its most costly.
Only World War II cost more money, and only the Civil War
and the two world wars cost more American lives.

One might

wonder, then, why no formal declaration of war was ever
forthcoming from the Congress.(Ill)
Post-World War II experience seemed to indicate the
president no longer needed a declaration of war from
Congress to commit American troops to action.

The Johnson

administration maintained the position that "while any
formal support that Congress might wish to extend in a
given instance would be welcomed, the independent power of
the executive was sufficient."(112)
Johnson's Undersecretary of State Katzenbach went so
far as to state that since war was outlawed by the United
Nations Charter, and armed force was only allowed in
self-defense or in response to UN action, the concept of
declarations of war had lost all international
significance.(Ill)
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Harold Hyman claims that Johnson and presidents after
him have misread presidential war powers history.(113)

He

cites the various examples where presidents have used
military forces without a declaration of war and compares
it to the situation in Vietnam in 1964.

Where previous

cases were either sanctioned by the United Nations or dealt
with threats to American security or the lives of
significant numbers of American citizens abroad, the United
States had only a small number of advisers threatened in
Vietnam in 1964.

Although Hyman believes a constitutional

requirement existed for congressional support of LBJ's
Vietnam policy, he acknowledges that even if such a
requirement did not exist, some politically strong sanction
was necessary to enlarge the U.S. presence in the region.
The events leading up to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
illustrate the presidential war powers already being
exercised by Johnson in 1964.

By the summer of 1964, the

U.S. Navy was conducting so-called DeSoto patrols as part
of a covert operation known as 34A.

Operation 34A's

purpose was to advise, train and assist South Vietnamese
naval forces in interdicting North Vietnamese vessels.(114)
The DeSoto patrols were coastal reconnaissance
missions aimed at investigating enemy naval potential.
They were generally carried out by U.S. Navy destroyers
carrying "COMVAN" equipment and extra crewmen.

Their

mission was to collect information on water depth and
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temperature, navigation lights and buoys, currents and tide
patterns.

Patrols also observed maritime traffic for

evidence of military activity.

"COMVAN" equipment was used

to identify radar transmitters, plot their locations,
estimate effective ranges, and record emissions.
Finally, coastline photographs were taken to identify
prominent landmarks, military installations, and new
construction.

All of this information was intended to help

the South Vietnamese counter any North Vietnamese naval
strategies.(115)
On July 30-31, 1964, the South Vietnamese navy shelled
the North Vietnamese islands of Hon Me and Hon Ngu,
approximately three miles from the mainland.

By July 31,

the U.S. destroyer Maddox was patrolling the Tonkin Gulf
area where these islands are located.

The Navy claims the

Maddox entered the gulf to stimulate and monitor North
Vietnamese and Chinese radars.(116)
While on patrol approximately 30 miles from the
mainland on August 2nd, the Maddox intercepted emissions
indicating potentially hostile intentions by North
Vietnamese patrol boats.

A message was dispatched to

Admiral Sharp's headquarters in Hawaii describing the
intelligence.

The Admiral ordered resumption of

surveillance when the captain of the Maddox deemed it
"prudent."
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At li:00am and 2:40pm the Maddox changed course to
avoid three North Vietnamese patrol boats it identified on
radar.

The destroyer radioed the aircraft carrier

Ticonderoqa that it would fire in self-defense if
necessary.

According to the captain's log, the Maddox

fired six salvos before the North Vietnamese returned
fire.(117)

Secretary of Defense McNamara testified before

Congress that the first three shots were warning shots
fired by the destoyer's five inch guns.

Weapons officer

Lieutenant Raymond Connell later told a reporter that all
shots fired were aimed at the enemy.
The Ticonderoqa launched four Crusader aircraft to
assist.

Following a 21 minute battle, the aircraft

reported two vessels damaged and one dead in the water with
no personnel injuries or equipment damage to U.S. Navy
assets.
The North Vietnamese promptly publicized the August
2nd engagement, claiming their patrol boats "drove the
intruder out of Vietnamese waters" and shot down two U.S.
aircraft.(118)

What happened over the next two days is

less clear.
On August 3 and 4, the South Vietnamese attacked two
points on the North Vietnamese mainland.

Believing the

United States directly participated in the shelling, the
North Vietnamese protested.

The Johnson administration
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stated publicly that there was no American participation in
the shelling.
During the afternoon and evening of August 4th, the
Maddox was cruising in rough seas about 65 nautical miles
from the Vietnamese mainland.

At 7:40pm/ five surface

radar contacts were recorded approximately 36 miles
northeast of the Maddox, identified as probable North
Vietnamese torpedo boats.

An interesting note is that the

normal range of the radar carried on board the Maddox was
20-25 miles, with longer ranges possible with degraded
reliability due to ducting.
At 8:36pm, the Maddox radar identified two surface
vessels and three aircraft.

The Ticonderoqa immediately

launched fighter cover to protect destroyers in the area.
The Maddox then lost the three aircraft contacts from its
radar.

At 9:30, additional unidentified vessels were shown

closing at speeds in excess of 40 knots.

At this point,

the Maddox reported hostile intentions by the radar
contacts.

At a range of 8000 yards, the Maddox

unsuccessfully fired star shells in an attempt to light the
target for visual identification.

As the targets closed to

6000 yards, the destroyer C. Turner Joy opened fire.

The

Maddox was now unable to locate the targets on radar.
The crew reported dodging a number of torpedos and sinking
two attacking boats.

The C. Turner Joy also reported
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being fired on by automatic weapons while being illuminated
by searchlights.(119)
Just as promptly as they had publicized the first
incident, the North Vietnamese denied any engagement on
August 4th.

The captain of the Maddox reported the

incident to Admiral Sharp, who contacted Secretary
McNamara.

Despite doubts expressed by Admiral Sharp,

President Johnson ordered retaliatory airstrikes against
North Vietnam at 6:07am on August 5th.
Before the ships involved could answer inquiries for
facts, President Johnson went on television to announce
retaliatory action.

McNamara ordered 64 airstrikes at four

patrol boat bases and a major oil depot.

Bomb damage

reporting indicated that 10% of North Vietnam's patrol boat
storage was up to 90% destroyed.(120)

Two U.S. planes were

destroyed and two were damaged in the attack.
Fifteen minutes after the president ordered the
strike, he called in 16 Congressional leaders for a 90
minute briefing about the incident.

According to

Republican leader Everett Dirksen,
The whole case was laid on the table by the President,
by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, by
the Secretary of Defense, and by the Secretary of
State. Thereafter, there was no limit on the amount
of discussion or on the questions that any member of
the joint leadership from both the House and Senate
might have wished to propound, whether they were
addressed to the Secretaries or to the President.(121)
As he requested in his television address, LBJ had
asked the Congressional leaders for a resolution "making it
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clear that our government is united in its determination to
take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in
defense of peace in Southeast Asia."(122)

Records show

that all 16 Congressional leaders supported such a
resolution and none felt it was significant that they were
consulted after the attack was ordered.
In the House of Representatives, Robert W. Kastenmeir
suggested a "haunting suspicion" that Congress was about
to "endorse, as it did in 1898 (after the sinking of the
USS Maine), a disproportionate response to a limited and
ambiguous challenge."(123)

Nevertheless, he voted for

the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
During debate on the resolution, Senator Wayne Morse
of Oregon dared to dissent from the popular position.

He

stated his belief that electronic espionage by the Maddox
done so close to South Vietnamese attacks, both in location
and time, could not help but be seen as provocation by the
North Vietnamese.
On August 6th, Senators Cooper and Fulbright debated
the long term effects of the resolution on presidential war
powers on the Senate floor:
Cooper- Are we now giving the President advance authority
to take whatever action he may deem necessary respecting
South Viet Nam and its defense, or with regard to the
defense of any other country included in the (SEATO)
treaty?
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Fulbright- Correct.
Cooper- ...looking ahead, the President decided that it was
necessary to use such force as could lead into war, will we
give that authority by this resolution?
Fulbright- That is the way I would interpret it.

If a

situation later developed in which we thought the approval
should be withdrawn, it could be withdrawn by concurrent
resolution.(124)
Fulbright went on to argue that the speed of modern warfare
requires anticipation of events.

In other words, Congress

can not react quickly enough to allow for military
effectiveness.

He also implied the president did not need

to consult with the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Congress
under the terms of the resolution.
The Tonkin Gulf Resolution passed the House 416-0 and
the Senate 88-2 on August 10, 1964.

It stated,

the Congress approves and supports the determination
of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take all
necessary measures to repel any armed attack against
the forces of the United States and to prevent further
aggression...consonant with the Constitution of the
United states...the United States is therefore
prepared, as the President determines, to take the
necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to
assist any member or protocol state (of the SEATO)
requesting assistance in the defense of its
freedom.(Ill)
Although repelling armed attack had historically been
recognized as a presidential war power, the resolution
allowing the president to determine the necessary steps to
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defend the freedom of allies seems to pass up Congressional
authority over war making.
The Johnson administration certainly interpreted the
resolution as a broad grant of power.

In testimony before

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 17, 1967,
Under Secretary of State Nicholas de B. Katzenbach called
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution the "functional equivalent" of a
declaration of war.(125)
The dangers of such a broad grant of power by Congress
to the president quickly became evident.

The North

Vietnamese claimed a Johnson fabrication the day of the
second gulf incident.

In a "Memorandum Regarding the U.S.

War Acts Against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the
First Days of August 1964," Hanoi's Ministry of Foreign
Affairs said,
This is an imprudent fabrication inasmuch as in the
day and night of August 4, 1964, no naval craft of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam was present in the area
where the U.S. destroyers were allegedly "attacked for
a second time by North Vietnamese PT boats." The
alleged attack was deliberately staged by the United
States to have a pretext for carrying out its criminal
designs against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
According to reports from various sources, a task
group of the Seventh Fleet including the aircraft
carrier Ticonderoga and the destroyers Berkeley,
Edson, Harry Hubbard, and Samuel Moore were cruising
on a permanent basis in the South China Sea off Da
Nang. On August 4, 1964, the Harry Hubbard met with
the HQ609 and HQ11 of the South Vietnamese navy 60
kilometers off Da Nang. Thereafter, the South
Vietnamese ships did not return to their base...as
usual. In the same night, from 2000 to 2200, at
about the time when "North Vietnamese PT boats"
allegedly "attacked the Maddox and the Turner Joy" gun
shelling was heard, flares and planes were seen
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off the shores of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
on international waters.
That is what the Pentagon termed the "second
deliberate attack" on the destroyers Maddox and Turner
Joy, or the "second Tonkin Gulf incident."(126)
Subsequent investigation by Congressional committees
and Pentagon officials fueled doubt that the second
incident had actually taken place.

To begin with, August

weather conditions in the Tonkin Gulf are extremely
turbulent.

On the night of August 4th the Maddox was

encountering rough seas due to thunderstorms.

The Maddox

was encountering sonar malfunctions as well as atmospheric
interference with her radar system.

Technicians later

testified that false returns caused by weather, high seas,
or propeller action were not only possible, but likely.
At approximately 8:00pm, the Maddox intercepted North
Vietnamese radio transmissions which gave Captain John
Herrick the impression that patrol boats were preparing for
action.

The actual transcripts of these messages remain

classified today due to the intelligence sources used to
collect them.

When the Ticonderoqa sent air support

responding to Herrick's request, the eight Crusader jets
found no evidence of enemy naval activity.(127)
Automatic weapons fire reported by the C. Turner Jov
turned out to be the Maddox's anti-aircraft barrage fired
at erroneous radar targets.

While the C. Turner Joy

located a number of enemy vessels on radar, the Maddox was
unable to confirm any radar targets due to malfunctions.
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Similarly, the Maddox identified 22 torpedo shots on sonar,
none of which was seen by the C. Turner Joy's sonar men.
As Galloway points out, North Vietnamese patrol boats carry
only two torpedos, so 11 boats would have had to be
present.

No evidence exists to support such a claim.(128)

Captain Herrick would later testify that the false sonar
targets probably resulted from his own screw beats from
evasive maneuvering.
Even as early as the hours following disengagement
from the alleged attack, Captain Herrick and the men of the
Maddox began to doubt some of the details of what had just
happened.

In an immediate message to Admiral Sharp in

Hawaii, Herrick said the "entire action leaves many doubts"
and that a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight" by
aircraft would be necessary to confirm the accuracy of
initial reports.(129)
Despite awareness of these reports by Secretary
McNamara and a call by him to Admiral Sharp stating that
retaliation could not be justified

"unless we are damned

sure what happened," political momentum already had caused
the president to act.

The question remains whether

President Johnson created that momentum to justify his
actions or the momentum already established forced him to
act.

By the time anyone was able to sort out what actually

happened, the decisions had been made and the retaliatory
airstrikes had been carried out.
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By early 1965, even the president had significant
doubts about whether a second incident had ever occurred.
He told a close aide that reports of the incidents were
merely an example "of what I have to put up with" at the
Pentagon.

He added, "For all I know, our Navy was shooting

at whales out there."(130)

Current evidence indicates that

Navy communications and reports were working as designed,
but the president's political need for a Congressional
resolution of support and an impulsive decision were more
the cause of his problems.
Added support for the skepticism came on July 1, 1966
when the U.S. Navy captured a North Vietnamese patrol boat
division commander whom they described as "cooperative and
reliable."

The prisoner reported extensively on the attack

of August 2nd, but claimed to know nothing of any activity
on the 4th.

His claims were backed up by the stories of

other prisoners of war.(131)
Whether or not the second incident ever took place,
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution definitely became Johnson's
justification for escalation of the war in Vietnam.

By the

end of 1965, 181,382 more American troops had been sent to
southeast Asia with over 500,000 eventually arriving in the
region.

In addition, President Johnson ordered the

systematic bombing of North Vietnam on February 7, 1965,
explaining that there would be no more "tit for tat."
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In September, 1965, the Lawyers Committee on American
Policy Toward Viet Nam issued a statement on the
president's actions since the Gulf of Tonkin incident.
They claimed that Johnson administration policies were
contrary to international law and the U.S. Constitution.
A March 4, 1966 State Department White Paper titled
"The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense
of Viet Nam" claimed that without a declaration of war, the
president could commit combat troops acting as the
commander-in-chief, a party to the SEATO treaty, and by
consent of the Congress outlined in the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution.

An interesting observation becomes clear.

In every case we have studied since World War II, treaty
commitments were a significant argument justifying lone
presidential action.

In the Truman case, participation in

the United Nations was a justification for the Korean War.
In the Eisenhower and Kennedy cases, widespread commitments
to mutual defense treaties where the U.S. acted as a
"nuclear umbrella" were important contributors to decision
making by the president.
In this case, the Johnson administration relied
largely on Article IV paragraph 1 of the SEATO treaty which
said in case of armed attack, each member would "meet the
common danger in accordance with its constitutional
processes."(132)

Obviously, the Johnson administration's

entire justification for escalation in Vietnam had to rely
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on the commander-in-chief powers unless the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution could add to the argument.
As Rossiter explains,
The central paradox of the Johnson administration's
response to the Tonkin Gulf resolution was that, while
the administration requested the resolution and
employed it openly as the justification for the use
of armed forces in Asia, the administration also
declared that the resolution was not necessary.(133)
It is hard to believe that President Johnson truly felt he
did not need the resolution to justify expansion of the
Vietnam war.

In a news conference on August 18, 1967, he

said,
We stated then, and we repeat now, we did not think
the resolution was necessary to do what we did and
what we are doing. But we thought it desirable. We
thought if we were going to ask them to stay the whole
route, and if we expected them to be there on the
landing we ought to ask them to be there on the take
off.(134)
By this time, Fulbright and other Senators came to
regret the resolution and began to call for limits on the
president and an investigation of the Tonkin Gulf affair.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted the
investigation and found that Secretary McNamara had misled
the committee by not telling "how increasingly ambiguous
the reports of the second incident became as the hours wore
on.

What he described in such positive terms was actually

a highly confused event."(135)
By March 8, 1968, the investigation was complete and
Senator Fulbright commented,
Insofar as the consent of this body is said to derive
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from the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, it can only be
said that the resolution, like any other contract
based on misrepresentation, in my opinion, is null
and void.(136)
Repeal of the resolution would eventually come.

Public

dissatisfaction with the war and more reports of
misrepresentation would finally cause the Congress to act
in order to "take back" some of the war making powers it
had handed over to the president since World War II.
Lyndon Johnson had been able to expand presidential
commander-in-chief powers to new extremes, but that same
expansion of power became his political downfall.

The next

president would have to wrestle with the Congress over
appropriate uses of presidential war powers.

CHAPTER VI. NIXON-CAMBODIA AND THE WAR POWERS ACT
Throughout 1967 and 1968, a variety of factors
combined to increase the disillusionment of many in the
United States about the Johnson administration's Vietnam
policy.

By early 1968, public opinion so strongly opposed

the president that he elected not to run for reelection.
Although all the precedent and policy machinery was already
in place to continue the war in Vietnam, Richard Nixon
entered the White House in 1969 with a different set of
pressures affecting his Vietnam policy.

Clearly,

significant pressure existed to end U.S. involvement and
bring the troops home.

On the other hand, American foreign

policy concerns about southeast Asia had not really
changed, and the Nixon administration still felt a need to
support the efforts of the South Vietnamese against
Communism.
Richard Nixon's expansion of the war into Cambodia
provides an illustration of the ultimate in presidential
war powers.

Never before had a U.S. president secretly

arranged to go to war against another country without
consulting more than a handful of close personal advisors.
Not only were the arrangements secret, but the actual
conduct of the war remained secret for quite some time.
While relying on post-World War II precedent and the
commander-in-chief clause of the Constitution, the Nixon
administration carried on the last uninhibited war from the
95
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White House.

Reaction to this war would finally bring

about the reassertion of power by the Congress through the
War Powers Act of 1973.

All subsequent presidents, while

denying the constitutional basis for the War Powers Act,
would basically comply with its provisions.
President Nixon did not rely on the same rationale as
President Johnson to justify his actions in southeast Asia.
The administration quickly silenced any reliance on the
SEATO treaty voiced by Johnson's people.

This change was

based on arguments by Nixon's advisors that actions based
on SEATO agreements were shaky at best.
The North Vietnamese were quick to test the new
president.

In February, 1969, small scale offensives were

launched which relied on troop and equipment sanctuaries
located just inside Cambodia.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk of

Cambodia loudly proclaimed his country's neutrality in an
attempt to protect Cambodian sovereignty.
We are a country caught between the hammer and the
anvil, a country that would very much like to
remain the last haven of peace in Southeast Asia.(137)
To protect his sovereignty from stronger North Vietnamese
military incursions into his territory, Prince Sihanouk had
granted President Johnson the right of "hot pursuit" in
December, 1967.

In other words, U.S. forces could pursue

fleeing Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops into Cambodia
to eliminate their sanctuaries.

Johnson had rejected the
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idea because he was reluctant to expand an already
unpopular war.
General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, brought the issue up again to the new president.
Nixon recalls his reaction to the North Vietnamese attacks.
My immediate instinct was to retaliate. Kissinger and
I agreed that if we let the Communists manipulate us
at this early stage, we might never be able to
negotiate with them from a position of equality, much
less one of strength. Johnson had made this mistake
and had never been able to recover the
initiative.(138)
General Creighton Abrams, commander of U.S. forces in
South Vietnam called General Wheeler on February 9th to
inform him that photographic intelligence confirmed the
Central Office for South Vietnam or COSVN in Base Area 353,
one of the suspected sanctuary areas inside Cambodia.
COSVN was allegedly a North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
headquarters established to direct the war effort in South
Vietnam.

Up until this time, COSVN had been reported

located inside Laos.

Abrams requested an attack on COSVN.

General Abrams called for "a short-duration,
concentrated B-52 attack of up to 60 sorties, compressing
the time interval between strikes to the minimum.

This is

more than we would normally use to cover a target of this
size, but in this case it would be wise to insure complete
destruction."(139)

The objective was to damage the enemy's

offensive capability in order to allow for the withdrawal
of U.S. ground troops from South Vietnam.
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Abrams argued that there was little chance of inciting
Cambodian reaction since the B-52s would only be over
Cambodian airspace for about one minute.

In addition, the

sanctuaries were supposedly located in sparsely populated
areas, so the chance of civilian casualties was low.
The Joint Chiefs forwarded the message to Secretary of
Defense Melvin Laird, then on to National Security Advisor
Henry Kissinger and President Nixon.

Abrams reportedly did

not expect much to come of his suggestion, and was
encouraged when the Joint Chiefs of Staff told him to make
a tentative plan for an attack early on March 18th.
The Central Intelligence Agency did not strongly
support General Abrams' and defense intelligence's
estimates concerning the COSVN.

In a report to the

president, the CIA still expected the Ho Chi Minh Trail in
Laos was logistically more important to the enemy effort
than the Cambodian sanctuaries.(140)
Some historical background is helpful to understand
the decision that faced President Nixon.

Since he came to

power in 1955, Prince Sihanouk's primary ambition was to
preserve Cambodia's independence from foreign powers.
National survival was always his major political issue.

To

ensure this survival, Sihanouk pursued a "policy of extreme
neutrality" playing off his neighbors against each
other.(141)

Richard Nixon met Prince Sihanouk while

serving as Vice President under Eisenhower.

His initial
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impression of Sihanouk as "troublesome" lasted through his
time as president.
In 1958, South Vietnam violated the Cambodian border
several times in pursuit of enemy forces.

While the U.S.

supported the South Vietnamese in this endeavor, Sihanouk
developed diplomatic relations with China to counter the
South Vietnamese threat to Cambodian sovereignty.
A 1959 Department of Defense study titled,
"Psychological Operations: Cambodia" attempted to find
"effective" groups in Cambodian society who might be
subject to American pressure.

The study concluded the

Cambodian people were "by and large a docile passive
people.

They cannot be counted on to act in any positive

way for the benefit of U.S. aims and policies."(142)

The

Pentagon suggested the best possibilities for support were
with the middle class urban elite and the military officer
corps.

Interestingly, these two groups were instrumental

in Sihanouk's overthrow in 1970.
American aid provided 14% of annual revenues and 30%
of the Cambodian military budget by 1963.

In the eyes of

the middle class, this U.S. money provided the only chance
for economic and social progress.

American military money

did buy friends in the Cambodian officer corps, but a
provision of U.S. law insulted Prince Sihanouk.

According

to military aid law, Americans had to inspect the "end use"
of U.S. military equipment sold abroad to be sure it was
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not being sold to communist forces.

Sihanouk saw such an

intrusion as another threat to his independence.
In 1963, Sihanouk publicly announced his belief that
the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong would eventually triumph
over South Vietnamese and American forces.

His dislike for

the American arms arrangement and an increasing reliance by
the Cambodian military on American aid caused him to
renounce all American aid agreements and send all U.S.
military aid missions home.
Reporting on his last call to Cambodian Minister of
Defense Lon Nol, General Taber, head of the U.S. military
aid mission said,
Lon Nol's friendliness was apparently genuine and his
indirect placing of responsibility on Sihanouk for the
termination of U.S. aid, as well as his assurance that
Cambodia will never voluntarily become a communist
country imply the possibility that there is a point
beyond which the military will refuse to support the
Chief of State.(143)
It would take six more years before General Taber's
prediction would come true.
Newsweek contributed to Prince Sihanouk's displeasure
with the United States in 1965 when it published an article
attacking him and his family for enjoying the profits from
a brothel business.

This article, coupled with the first

deployment of American combat troops to South Vietnam,
resulted in a break in diplomatic relations between the
Prince's government and the United States.
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Although Sihanouk did not particularly like the
communists any more than he did the United States, American
strategy in the Vietnam war directly affected foreign
incursions on Cambodian territory.

Throughout 1965,

General Westmoreland ordered search and destroy missions
pushing in from the Vietnamese coast to eliminate enemy
strongholds and supply lines.

The U.S. Navy also

established a coastal blockade to strangle sea lines of
supply and communication.
Sihanouk elected to allow sanctuaries for communist
forces in Cambodia's eastern provinces.

This was largely

done out of a fear of the communists' military might.
Meanwhile, the Viet Cong established the Ho Chi Minh Trail
through Laos and northeast Cambodia to keep supply lines
safe from American interdiction efforts.
In 1966, Chou En-lai asked the prince for the use of
the port of Sihanoukville to ship supplies to the Viet
Cong.

Sihanouk agreed to the arrangement because he would

receive 1/3 of all supplies shipped for his own country.
The Central Intelligence Agency was aware of the agreement,
but minimized its importance in reports to the president.
The Nixon administration commissioned its own study in 1969
and found that five times the amount of supplies indicated
in CIA reports were being shipped through Sihanoukville to
the enemy.

Later findings would support the Nixon

figures.(144)
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President Johnson ordered special forces and the CIA
to recruit mercenaries from eastern Cambodia to disrupt the
sanctuaries in 1967.

Without notifying Congress, LBJ

ordered clandestine reconnaissance and sabotage missions
code-named Salem House into Cambodia to interrupt supply
shipments.

These missions would later be known as Daniel

Boone missions.

In all, 1835 missions were carried out

over the next four years.
Expanding U.S. activity in South Vietnam forced the
communists west into Cambodia, but Prince Sihanouk's
military had deteriorated since 1963 because of the cut-off
in U.S. aid.

He found himself unable to counter the

communists on Cambodian soil.

Sihanouk began to fear the

communists and made a political shift calling for more
right wing officials in government.
the Prime Ministry.

Lon Nol moved up to

Although the mood was more

pro-American, the goal was still to play the foreigners
against each other.
According to the Nixon administration, Sihanouk
contacted the U.S. ambassador to India, Chester Bowles.
He reportedly told Bowles that he could not object to a
U.S. bombing of the communist sanctuaries in Cambodia.
Shawcross points out that the declassified portions of
Bowles' reports do not support this.(145)

Sihanouk's

French aide Charles Meyer later said the intent was for
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small scale attacks, not the large B-52 raids which
actually took place.
By the time Richard Nixon took office in 1969, over
40,000 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops had sanctuary
in a 10-15 mile strip just inside Cambodia.

The new

president's attitude toward ending the war rested on his
experiences in dealing with World War II and Korea, as well
as his observations of the Johnson administration in
Vietnam.

The Nixon position was that appeasement results

in a drawn out and expensive war.

The administration's

goal was to operate from a position of military and
diplomatic strength.
Despite pessimistic reports from nearly all executive
agencies including the Defense Department, Nixon and
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger believed the war
could end on satisfactory terms if domestic opposition
could be reduced and if Hanoi and Moscow could be convinced
of a O.S. will to expand the fighting beyond the
self-imposed limits of the Johnson administration.(146)
Since the administration believed that most domestic
opposition stemmed from the draft, they embarked on a
program of "Vietnamization" to gradually transfer
responsibility for the preservation of South Vietnam to the
South Vietnamese themselves.

To convince the communists of

U.S. willingness to expand the conflict, Nixon and
Kissinger believed they had to appear to be unpredictable.
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In order to appear unpredictable, Nixon would have to be
unpredictable and this became the problem.
On his first day in office, Nixon had asked for ideas
on how to "quarantine" Cambodia and thus cut the enemy's
supply lines.

General Abrams' request followed shortly and

the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that bombing and a limited
invasion were politically more feasible than a quarantine
because criticism would come after, not during the
action.(147)
On March 4, 1969, Nixon issued his first threat to the
communists in an attempt to scare Hanoi and Moscow about
his unpredictability.

Secretly and without contacting

Congress, he ordered the beginning of what became known as
"the Menu."

Operation Breakfast would consist of 48 B-52

sorties against the Cambodian sanctuaries beginning March
18th.

Although a handful of sympathetic Congressmen were

told, the president insisted on absolute secrecy to protect
the operation.

Even Secretary of the Air Force Robert

Seamans, Air Force Chief of Staff General John Ryan, the
Cambodian desk officers on General Abrams' intelligence
staff, and key Congressional committees were not informed
of the action.
Over the next 14 months, a secret systematic bombing
of Cambodian sanctuaries took place. Over 3600 B-52
missions were flown along different sections of the
Cambodian border in operations known as "Lunch, Snack,
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Dinner, Dessert, and Supper."

In order to maintain

secrecy, the pilots and navigators on the B-52 raids were
quietly briefed on new targets and told not to report them
as a "diversion" during debriefing.

This way, the crews

would never know that no one else was aware of the real
targets.
An elaborate dual reporting system was developed to
make the strike results "disappear."

Ground radar

operators directing the strikes received secret target
information with the reporting paperwork already filled
out.

These false reports were then filed with the

Strategic Air Command's advanced echelon eliminating any
suspicion by those not directly involved in the bombing.
The original target coordinates would be destroyed in
classified waste after the strikes were carried out.
Stanley Karnow describes the importance of secrecy to
the operation.

Nixon's goal was to demonstrate U.S.

resolve to Hanoi and Moscow to force them to the
negotiating table.

By remaining silent, pressure was taken

off Prince Sihanouk to protest the bombing in order to
protect his neutrality.

Additionally, domestic opposition

at home would be minimized until peace negotiations were
already underway.(140)

The administration did not carry

out a simultaneous campaign against North Vietnamese
targets to protect the Paris talks already ongoing.
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By the fall of 1969, General Abrams and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff were able to see that the B-52 strikes were
not accomplishing their objective.

Although they were very

effective at destroying their targets, the bombing raids
merely forced the enemy farther west into the heart of
Cambodia.

Without a credible defense, local officials now

were having problems keeping the communists under control.
By February, 1970, both North and South Vietnamese troops
were deep inside Cambodia.

Cambodia was now calling for,

but not getting United Nations help in maintaining its
neutrality. Options seen by the administration included
heavy artillery attacks, use of South Vietnamese troops
with or without U.S. air and artillery support, and a
combined U.S./South Vietnamese ground effort.
At this point, General Abrams asked for permission to
conduct a ground invasion against the sanctuaries.
Although the president approved limited clandestine
attacks, he refused to allow an invasion with Sihanouk
still in power.

In hindsight, it is easy to question the

military utility of such an invasion.

Perhaps the General

was merely trying to cover for past failures.
Other input to the president did not support an
invasion.

Mike Reeves, reporting from Phnom Penh, advised,

"It would be very risky to try to solve the North
Vietnamese problem in Cambodia by force.

I would consider
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our best action to be to wait on events, saying
little."(148)
The president's advisors now finally brought up the
issue of the constitutionality of an invasion into
Cambodia.

Could the president expand the war to another

country without telling more than a few sympathetic
Congressmen?

Kissinger thought very little of Congress,

claiming their incompetence in foreign affairs.(149)

He

went so far as to propose a moratorium on all debates about
the administration's Vietnam policies.
Others close to the president justified action based
on a "Sihanouk excuse."

The Prince's desires to maintain

neutrality justified secrecy in order to protect him and
his policy.

In effect, support for a leader the president

did not even like justified secrecy, wiretaps, burning and
falsification of reports, and concealing the widening of
the war from the Congress and the people of the United
States.
The president himself preferred to justify military
action into Cambodia based on his responsibility as
commander-in-chief to protect the lives of the forces under
his command.(150)

As he briefed the bi-partisan

Congressional leadership later,
I just want you to know that whether you think it's
right or wrong, the reason I have decided to do this
is that I have decided it's the best way to end the
war and save the lives of our soldiers.(151)
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One of the barriers keeping President Nixon from
ordering an invasion of Cambodia was removed on March 18,
1970, when Prince Sihanouk was ousted by a coup while
visiting Moscow and Peking.

Prime Minister Lon Nol, who

had historically supported the American position, became
the leader of the new government.

On April 14th, he issued

an appeal to the United States to help control violence in
Cambodia and oust the North Vietnamese.(152)
President Nixon decided to support Lon Nol, but was
tense over reports in the press of secret bombing by U.S.
forces in Laos.

He ordered secret arms shipments to Phnom

Penh and training of Khmer units in Vietnam who could later
be launched into Cambodia.

Although the Joint Chiefs

expressed doubts over the success of such a move, they
told General Abrams to order all captured enemy weapons
collected and secretly shipped to Phnom Penh.
On April 20, President Nixon announced the withdrawal
of 150,000 ground troops from Vietnam over the next year.
Despite his optimism about Vietnam, he stressed, "I shall
not hesitate to take strong and effective measures" to deal
with the threat to U.S. forces from enemy escalation in
Laos and Cambodia.(153)
With increasing communist pressure on Phnom Penh,
Kissinger and the military leaders called for an invasion
to protect the administration's policy of Vietnamization.
They reasoned that if the communist threat was not
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significantly reduced or eliminated, a continued presence
by U.S. forces in South Vietnam would be necessary.

They

failed to consider that prosecution of a ground campaign
without the support of Congress would also be damaging to
Vietnamization.
Unfortunately for the president, the CIA had prepared
a report on long-term considerations for Cambodia, but
Director Richard Helms withheld it from him.

Perhaps Helms

did not agree with the conclusions or he thought it was not
what Nixon wanted to hear.

In any case, presentation of

the report might have been helpful because of its accurate
prophecy.

In "Stocktaking in Indochina: Longer Term

Prospects," the CIA analysts agree with the president's
assessment that denying Cambodian sanctuaries was a threat
to Hanoi's strategy.
do it.

They also claim Lon Nol was unable to

Such denial

would require heavy and sustained bombing and large
numbers of foot soldiers, who could be supplied
only by the United States and South Vietnam. Such
an expanded allied effort could seriously handicap
the communists and raise the cost to them of
prosecuting the war, but, however successful, it
probably would not prevent them from continuing
the struggle in some form.(154)
It is questionable whether the president or Kissinger would
have accepted these conclusions, but it is interesting to
note how accurate they were.
In a memo to Kissinger on April 22nd, the president
said,
We have really dropped the ball on this one due to the
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fact that we were taken in with the line that by
helping him (Sihanouk) we would destroy his
"neutrality" and give the North Vietnamese an excuse
to come in. Over and over again we fail to learn that
the Communists never need an excuse to come in.(155)
The president authorized final planning for an invasion.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Wheeler called Abrams
to develop the plan.

The operation was to begin April 27th

and "Our objective is to make maximum use of ARVN assets so
as to minimize U.S. involvement, and maintain lowest
possible U.S. profile."(156)
Secretary of State Rogers opposed the plan because he
believed an invasion would endanger Vietnamization due to
public outrage at an expansion of the war.

The

administration's answer to his opposition was to eliminate
his position in the information loop.

Kissinger appeared

to use this tactic quite often in order to quiet the voices
of dissent.
Conflicting reports exist about when the president
really decided to go ahead with the invasion of Cambodia.
Sometime between April 26th and April 28th, he made the
decision and informed Kissinger, H.R. Haldeman, and
Attorney General John Mitchell, but not the Secretaries of
State or Defense. Not one Congressional committee was told
either, despite the fact that the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee had informed Secretary of State Rogers of its
opposition to substantial aid to Lon Nol.

Speculation

exists that Nixon elected not to tell Congress until the
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invasion was underway because he wanted to reassert his
power after the Senate rejected Supreme Court nominees
Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell.

Nixon claims

his power to protect American troops as commander-in-chief
was enough.
The president announced his decision to the country on
television the night of April 30, 1970.
In cooperation with the armed forces of South Vietnam,
attacks are being launched this week to clean out
major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodian-Vietnam
border...This is not an invasion of Cambodia. The
areas in which these attacks will be launched are
completely occupied and controlled by North Vietnamese
forces...Tonight I again warn the North Vietnamese
that if they continue to escalate the fighting when
the United States is withdrawing its forces, I shall
meet my responsibility as Commander in Chief of our
Armed Forces to take the action I consider necessary
to defend the security of our American men.(157)
Anticipating the public backlash to come, Nixon
assigned Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist the
task of writing the legal justification for the invasion.
Citing historical precedent of France in Tunisia, Britain
in Yemen, and Israeli attacks on foreign sanctuaries,
Rehnquist told the New York City Bar Association,
The President's determination to authorize incursion
into these Cambodian border areas is precisely the
sort of tactical decision traditionally confided to
the Commander-in-Chief in the conduct of armed
conflict. From the time of the drafting of the
Constitution it has been clear that the Commander-inChief has authority to take prompt action to protect
American lives in situations involving hostilities...
President Nixon had an obligation as Commander-inChief of the country's armed forces to take what
steps he deemed necessary to assure their safety in
the field. A decision to cross the Cambodian
border...to destroy sanctuaries being utilized by

112

North Vietnamese in violation of Cambodia's
neutrality, is wholly consistent with that
obligation. It is a decision made during the course
of an armed conflict already commenced as to how that
conflict shall be conducted, rather than a
determination that some new and previously
unauthorized military venture shall be taken.(158)

Anti-war demonstrations on American college campuses
became violent.

A demonstration at Kent State University

ended with the deaths of four students fired on by National
Guard troops called out to restore order.
Reaction in the Congress was equally loud.

The day

after the invasion began, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee approved a bill to repeal the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution and charged the president with usurping
Congressional war powers by not consulting them.

On May

11, the committee approved an amendment to the Foreign
Military Sales Act restricting future Cambodian
operations.

By the time the bill passed, it said no new

troops were authorized in Cambodia after June 30, 1970, no
new advisers were permitted for the Cambodian military, all
air operations in direct support of Cambodian forces must
end, and assistance by the United States did not constitute
a commitment to defend Cambodia.(159)
To justify his failure to consult Congress, President
Nixon said,
I trust we don't have another situation like Cambodia,
but I do know that in the modern world there are times
when the Commander-in-Chief...will have to act
quickly. I can assure the American people that the
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President is going to bend over backward to consult
the Senate and consult the House whenever he feels
that it can be done without jeopardizing the lives of
American men. But when it is a question of the lives
of American men or the attitudes of people in the
Senate, I am coming down hard on the side of defending
the lives of American men.(160)
Not all reaction to the invasion was negative.

In Great

Britain, The Economist said,
It is not the Americans who have brought the war to
Cambodia, but the Communists. For years, North
Vietnam has violated the neutrality of this countrywith barely a chirp of protest from the rest of the
world...To condemn the United States for "invading"
neutral Cambodia is about as rational as to condemn
Britain for "invading" formerly neutral Holland in
1944.(161)
By the end of the operation on June 30th, U.S. forces
captured individual weapons to outfit 74 battalions, enough
rice for all the enemy forces in South Vietnam for four
months, 143,000 rockets, mortars and recoilless rifle
rounds (14 months worth), 199,552 anti-aircraft rounds,
5482 mines, 62,022 grenades, 83,000 lbs. of explosives, 435
vehicles, and 11,688 bunkers and military structures.
American casualties in South Vietnam dropped from 93 per
week prior to the invasion to 51 per week in the six month
period after June 30th.

Clearly, the sanctuaries were

important to the communist effort, but the U.S. never found
any evidence of a central headquarters inside Cambodia.
Public disclosure of the B-52 raids did not happen
until 1973 when military officers involved in the early
operations contacted members of Congress.

New York Times

Pentagon correspondent William Beecher had asked Defense

114

Department officials how to extricate American troops after
the 1968 elections.

He was told "to bomb sanctuaries."

With no indication of such a plan at the time, Beecher
filed away the idea.
When rumors of the bombing began to surface in April,
1969, Beecher revisited the same Defense Department
officials.

He reported on Operation Breakfast in the May

9th New York Times.

Interestingly, there was no public

interest, no press follow-up, and no Senate concern until
four years later.(162)
The Nixon administration had clearly stretched the
presidential war power to the limit of what Congress and
the public would stand for.

With similar complaints

surfacing about Watergate, the time had finally come for
the Congress to reassert itself.
A good illustration of the expansion of the war power
over the previous twenty-five years is found in a story
about the early days of Vietnam.

In 1954, French foreign

minister Georges Bidault asked John Foster Dulles for U.S.
air support to help save Dien Bien Phu.

Dulles answered

that the president could not authorize even a single air
strike without Congressional approval.

President

Eisenhower added that he would not make any military
commitment to Indochina without the agreement of the
British and French governments and the complete support of
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the Congress.

Clearly things had changed by the time the

Nixon administration was running the war.(163)
A thought provoking story also comes from the Lincoln
administration.

When a subordinate advised the president

he had the power to invade a neighbor to repel an invasion,
Lincoln responded, "Study to see if you can fix any limit
to his power in this respect, after you have given him so
much as you propose."(164)
In order to reestablish the balance of power with
respect to war making, the Congress passed The War Powers
Resolution of 1973.

Prior to this act, Congress had only

been able to control the president through its power of the
purse as it had done to stop the Cambodian invasion.

The

Supreme Court had remained quiet on the Vietnam war issue,
so little real restraint was available on the president.
The War Powers Act set down procedures for the
president to follow when ordering American troops into
combat situations.

President Nixon vetoed the bill as an

unconstitutional intrusion on presidential authority, but
the Congress passed the bill over his veto.

Subsequent

presidents have all expressed similar disapproval with the
law, but have more or less complied with its provisions.
According to the law, the president can only commit
U.S. forces to combat under three conditions: a declaration
of war by Congress, specific statutory authorization, or in
a national emergency created by an attack on the United
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States or its armed forces.(165)

In the third instance,

the president must report immediately to Congress.

Unless

specifically authorized by Congress, the hostilities must
end within sixty days, and troops must be withdrawn within
ninety days.

After ninety days, the Congress may direct by

concurrent resolution not subject to veto, the return of
American troops.

The president is also obligated to report

to Congress before committing troops "in every possible
instance."
In terms of war making, the power of the president was
to change.

With the instability left in Cambodia after the

U.S. invasion and withdrawal, the first test of the War
Powers Resolution would soon come for another president in
the same part of the world.

CHAPTER VII. FORD-THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT
At 2:18pm local time on May 12, 1975, the Delta
Exploration Company in Jakarta, Indonesia received a mayday
radio message from the merchant vessel Mayaguez.

The

Mavaguez was a container vessel registered in the United
States delivering materiel under government contract.

The

mayday call indicated that she had been fired upon and
boarded by forces of the Cambodian navy.

The Mayaguez was

currently under tow to an unknown port in Cambodia.
The Mayaguez incident is important to the development
of post-world War II presidential war powers because of the
background leading up to it and timing of the event in
relation to feelings about the presidency in the United
States.

As we have seen, the United States had significant

impact on internal developments in Cambodia up until it
withdrew its forces from southeast Asia in 1973.
With the fall of Lon Nol's government in April, 1975,
the Khmer Rouge brought a communist government to power.
Remembering recent experience with the Americans, they
began to prod people out of the capital city of Phnom Penh
stating their belief that U.S. forces would strike again,
this time in the cities.

Although this may sound absurd to

us, it is helpful to remember the atmosphere in Cambodia at
the time.

Memories of American B-52 raids and the 1970

invasion were fresh.

President Ford and Secretary of State

Kissinger had made statements at the end of America's
117
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involvement in Vietnam describing a need to maintain
American credibility as a military power.

Finally, Henry

Kissinger was remembered as President Nixon's chief
proponent of acting unpredictably to maintain a position of
strength.

With Kissinger in office, could the United

States not continue to act in an unpredictable manner?

The

Cambodian communists needed to take the initiative to
protect themselves from the United States.
At home in the U.S., Gerald Ford had taken office in
August, 1974 at perhaps the most difficult moment for the
presidency in American history.

His predecessor had

resigned amidst charges of abusing presidential power.

The

combined stresses of Vietnam and Watergate had demoralized
the American public and Congress was making every effort to
assert itself over the president in many areas.
The War Powers Act and the presidential interpretation
of that law were about to meet their first test.

The S.,S.

Mavaguez belonged to Sea-Land Services, Inc. and was
enroute to Sattahip, Thailand from Hong Kong with a
containerized cargo of food, clothing, medical supplies,
mail and consumer products.

Cambodia and Vietnam were

mounting a full scale naval war against each other over
several islands in the vicinity of the Mavaauez's route.
When the communists came to power in Cambodia, they
claimed the seas up to 90 miles off shore as their national
limit.

This claim has more basis in nationalism than in
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international law.(166)

These waters included several

islands in the Gulf of Thailand historically claimed by
Cambodia.

These waters also included several major trade

routes to and from Asian ports.
Head, Short, and McFarlane cite four incidents prior
to May 12, 1975 illustrating the seriousness of the
Cambodian claim.(166)

First, Cambodian forces seized and

released several Thai fishing boats around May 2nd.
Second, the Cambodian navy fired on and attempted to board
a South Korean ship on May 4th.

Third, they seized several

South Vietnamese small craft on May 6th.

Fourth, Cambodia

detained a Panamanian ship for 36 hours on May 7th.

The

Mavaquez appeared to be the next in a string of seizures.
When Cambodia fell to the Khmer Rouge on April 17th,
several U.S. made gunboats were captured.

These gunboats

were used by the Cambodian navy to seize the Mavaquez.
Shortly after 2:00pm on May 12th, Cambodian gunboats fired
warning shots across the bow of the Mavaquez as it sailed
abeam the island of Paulo Wai.

Captain Charles T. Miller

brought his engines to idle and ordered the radio operator
to send a distress call to any station that might be
listening.

The vessel was unarmed and was sailing

approximately 65 miles off the Cambodian coast.
John Neal of the Delta Exploration Company in Jakarta
received the message and communicated with the Mavaquez
until approximately 4:00pm when all communications were
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lost with the ship.

At that time, Mr. Neal contacted the

U.S. embassy in Jakarta.
Initial reports from Indonesia arrived at the National
Military Command Center near Washington at 5:12am May 12th
(4:12pm Cambodia time).

The commander in chief, Pacific

(CINCPAC) was ordered to prepare a reconnaissance aircraft
for launch at approximately 7:00am.

The Joint Chiefs of

Staff ordered the aircraft to launch at 7:30.
The president's deputy assistant for national security
affairs Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft received word of
the seizure about 7:00am and briefed President Ford at his
daily intelligence briefing at 7:30.

Secretary of State

Kissinger was informed at his 8:00 staff meeting.

At 9:23,

Kissinger arrived at the White House to discuss the matter
with Scowcroft and the president.

President Ford called a

meeting of the National Security Council for noon.
The first U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft to arrive
on the scene flew over Paulo Wai at 10:28am eastern time.
The P-3 immediately found a number of vessels within 60
miles of the island.

Two were large enough to be the

Mavaguez but positive identification was impossible on the
very dark night, even when using parachute illumination
flares.
The National Security Council met at noon,
approximately nine hours after the capture of the ship.
attendance were Vice President Nelson Rockefeller,

In
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Secretary of State Kissinger/ Secretary of Defense Janies
Schlesinger/ CIA Director William Colby, Deputy Secretary
of State Robert Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of Defense
William Clements, acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff General David Jones, Assistant to the President
Donald Rumsfeld, Lieutenant General Scowcroft, and NSC
staffer Richard Smyser.

The purpose of the meeting was to

determine the facts in the case, attempt to determine
motives and objectives of the Cambodians, define U.S.
interests and objectives, assess possible third party
interests and discuss U.S. alternatives.(167)
Two reasons have been stated for President Ford to go
directly to a NSC meeting rather than beginning with a
lower level body.

First, time was critical.

The president

clearly remembered the Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo in
1968 and did not want to allow the Cambodians sufficient
time to transfer the crew to the mainland where their safe
recovery would be much more difficult.(168)
Second, the president felt the need to handle the
crisis himself.

The presidency had suffered greatly from

Vietnam and Watergate and American allies were beginning to
question the president's power to effectively handle
foreign policy.

A decisive move by President Ford would

help bolster confidence in the presidency.(169)

As

President Ford later explained,
First, I think it is the responsibility of the
president. The American people expect their president
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to act— particularly during crises— to restore matters
to normal and protect U.S. interests. Perhaps it was
also a carryover from the evacuations of Saigon and
Phnom Penh. Certainly in the environment we were in,
it was essential for the president to be directly
involved.(167)
The NSC quickly agreed on the two most important
American objectives: recover the ship and its crew, and
demonstrate American resolve to act in defense of its right
to passage on international waters.

President Ford

preferred open discussion among his advisors as the input
to his decision making.

Where Nixon liked written reports,

Ford liked to be present during the discussion, where he
could hear and digest dissenting views.
When asked whether his presence stifled discussion,
the president responded,
I don't believe so, at least not in the way I ran
the meetings. We had pretty freewheeling discussions.
I don't think anyone was inhibited because I was
there. You know, we had some pretty strong
personalities there. I did have occasion to act
in an arbitration role, but I believe this is a
proper role for the commander in chief.(170)
The president ordered a strong diplomatic protest note
sent to Cambodia through the People's Republic of China,
that the USS Coral Sea be ordered to the area, that an
amphibious task force be assembled in the Philippines, that
continuous photo reconnaissance be conducted over the area,
and that a public statement be made demanding release of
the ship and crew.

Agreement was quick.

would be prepared immediately.

A rescue mission
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While secretary Schlesinger wanted to limit the action
to the rescue of the ship and crew, secretary Kissinger
believed some statement of resolve should be made beyond
the rescue of the ship and crew.

Vice President

Rockefeller favored the use of B-52 strikes flying out of
Guam.

Kissinger favored a carrier-based strike, but argued

for a strong military response in any case.(171)

Nearly

all the members favored some sort of military action.
President Ford agreed that some statement of strength was
necessary, but that response could be something short of
B-52 strikes.
Surprisingly, the young man photographing the NSC
meeting made a suggestion which temporarily made each of
the members think in silence.

He suggested that perhaps

the seizure of the Mavaguez was not directed by the
government, but was rather the action of a local Cambodian
commander.

In this case, the amount of retaliation would

make no difference, because the government would have no
control over events.(172)

After some discussion,

sufficient evidence was presented to believe the communist
government of the Khmer Rouge did indeed order and have
control over the seizure of ships off the coast of
Cambodia.
Foreign responses began to arrive as diplomatic
efforts were carried out.

A Chinese official told the U.S.

they would not act in the event the United States chose to

124

use military force to recover its vessel.

The Thai

government expressed opposition to military action, but
President Ford dismissed it as mere rhetoric.

He said,

"Until the Mavaquez and her crew were safe, I didn't give a
damn about offending their sensibilities."(173)
At 9:16pm eastern time on May 13th, a Navy P-3 made a
low pass over a large ship anchored near Poulo Wai and read
the name Mayaguez on the bow and stern.

The P-3 also came

under fire from Cambodian patrol boats, receiving a .50
caliber hit in its tail.

Within the hour, the Mayaguez had

weighed anchor and appeared to be heading toward Kompong
Som.

Based on speed and heading, the reconnaissance teams

estimated the time enroute as six hours.

Scowcroft

received this report at 10:15pm and immediately returned to
the White House to inform the president.
Before meeting the president, Scowcroft questioned the
military assistant to the secretary Major General John
Wickham about the ability of aircraft to intercept the
Mavaquez and prevent its reaching the mainland.

At 1:00am,

General Wickham told General Scowcroft that Thai-based F-4
fighters could intercept the ship and attempt to turn it by
strafing its path.

Scowcroft ordered them launched and

asked the president for permission to carry out the
interdiction.

President Ford immediately approved.

A second NSC meeting was held at 10:30am May 13th.
Counsellors Robert Hartmann and John Marsh were added to
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the list of attendees.

Marsh's job was to handle reporting

of the event to the Congress.

Several alternatives were

discussed during the meeting, but the rapidly changing
situation did not allow the president to make a final
decision.
President Ford ordered the USS Hancock to leave the
Philippines with a Marine amphibious assault unit.

He also

directed deployment of a Marine battalion for a heliborne
assault and use of F-4, F-lll, and A-7 aircraft to prevent
the ship from reaching the mainland and to provide close
air support for any subsequent ground activity.

Finally,

the president directed preparation of a plan to deal with
the War Powers Resolution.
Consultations with Congress began about 5:30pm on May
13th in accordance with Section 3 of the War Powers Act.
During the first of four such sessions, John Marsh and the
White House staff contacted ten House and eleven Senate
members and told them of military measures the president
had ordered.
Early on May 14th, U.S. forces observed a fishing boat
moving the crew to the island of Koh Tang.

General Jones

told the NSC of five possible military options.

They

included boarding the Mayaguez, landing Marines on Koh
Tang, bombing the mainland with tactical aircraft, bombing
the mainland with B-52s out of Guam, and other special
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operations type military measures.

The president issued

four specific orders.
1. The state Department would deliver a letter to the
UN Secretary General seeking help in securing the
release of the ship and crew.
2. The JCS would plan to attack Tang Island on
Wednesday night, May 14, Washington time (the earliest
possible time after essential forces had arrived.) The
attack would include simultaneously landings by
marines from the USS Holt, and naval air attacks
against mainland targets to prevent Cambodian
reinforcement of the island or ship.
3. B—52 bombers in Guam would be alerted for
deployment against the Cambodian mainland if required
(although the president thought that very unlikely
and undesirable).
4. Small vessels would not be permitted transit
between Koh Tang and Kompong Som.(174)
The Joint Chiefs' plan to rescue the ship and crew had
several parts.

First, Marines would land on the USS Holt.

They would move alongside the Mayaguez, and take it with a
boarding party.

Next, a helicopter assault would be

conducted against Koh Tang using approximately 175 Marines
in two landing zones.

Meanwhile, two target complexes on

the mainland would come under air attack.

These targets

were the Ream airfield and naval base and the port of
Kompong Som.
Although the JCS hoped to have an extra day of
preparation in order to increase the odds of success, the
president and the NSC felt the urgency of early rescue of
the crew outweighed additional safety factors.

The Chiefs

decided the degree of risk was acceptable, and prepared to
launch the assault as planned on May 14th.
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At 11:15am on May 14th, John Marsh once again met with
key members of Congress to inform them that three Cambodian
patrol craft had been sunk and four others damaged in an
attempt to keep the Mayaquez from moving.
That afternoon, General Jones briefed the NSC on the
military plan.

The Washington Post reported one

participant's description of the president's reaction to
the JCS plan.
He was very calm and deliberate...For some reason, he
gave me the impression of being a general himself.
The impression I got was of a man who had been in the
military, and the members of the NSC were obviously
impressed with his knowledge of the military.
He was the one who pressed all the questions. He
wasn't going to be rushed into something that would
fall on his head.(175)
At the conclusion of the meeting, President Ford ordered
the plan executed.
He then used the same room to brief Congressional
leaders on his actions.

Although the president had

promised Senator Robert Byrd he would comply with the
reporting sections of the War Powers Act, he expressed some
doubt about its applicability to this rescue mission.(176)
A number of members of Congress were unsatisfied with
the president's attempts to consult with them.

Senator

Mansfield and Representative Holtzman complained that Ford
failed to consult with Congress before ordering action.
merely reported to them once the action was underway.

He
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Senator Eagleton responded by introducing three
amendments to the War Powers Act designed to "plug
loopholes."

He also asked the General Accounting Office

for a complete investigation into the incident.

"Such

reactions," the president thought, "were hopelessly
naive."(177)
By 8:20pm on May 14, the White House staff had
contacted most of the Senators who were unable to attend
the president's briefing.

According to a White House

staffer, about one-half of those contacted merely
acknowledged the information.

Press Secretary Ron Nessen

claimed the response was "a strong consensus of support and
no objections."(178)
Military forces deployed in response to presidential
orders carried out the JCS plan over the next day and
ceased all operations by 8:15pm on May 15th.

Due to the

short notice and lack of adequate intelligence, the
operation was costly.
but U.S. forces

The crew and ship were recovered,

had 41 killed and 50 wounded.

Most of

these casualties occurred during the amphibious assault on
Koh Tang.
Domestic reaction to the Mavaguez incident was
overwhelmingly supportive of the president's actions.
Congressional reaction was mixed.

Opposition rested with

partisan political objectives and dissatisfaction with

President Ford's attempts to comply with the War Powers
Act.
According to the president,
In accordance with my desire that the Congress be
informed on this matter and taking note of Section
4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, I wish to
report to you that at about 6:20am, 13 May, pursuant
to my instructions to prevent the movement of the
Mayaguez into a mainland port, U.S. aircraft fired
warning shots across the bow of the ship and gave
visual signals to small craft approaching the ship...
I directed the United States Armed Forces to isolate
the island and interdict any movement between the
ship or the island and the mainland...Our continued
objective in this operation was the rescue of the
captured American crew along with the retaking of the
ship Mayaguez. For that purpose, I ordered late this
afternoon an assault by United States Marines on the
island of Koh Tang to search out and rescue such
Americans as might still be held there...This
operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the
President's constitutional Executive power and his
authority as Commander-in-Chief of the United States
Armed Forces.(179)
The General Accounting Office study demanded by
Senator Eagleton was completed and made public in October,
1976.

The study was critical of the substantive handling

of the crisis, the decision making process used by the
president, and itself became a subject of controversy.
The GAO was especially critical of President Ford's
use of military force to rescue the ship and crew.
According to the GAO's International Division, several
non-military options were available that were not used.
Among them were: contacting Phnom Penh directly, contacting
Cambodian representatives in Paris and Moscow, and
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enlisting the diplomatic assistance of governments other
than the Chinese.(180)
The administration responded by pointing out that
Cambodia's diplomatic isolation and unwillingness to
communicate with anyone precluded all the GAO options
within the time constraints allowed by the situation.

They

also believed that such efforts were unnecessary since no
evidence exists to indicate that the diplomatic protest
lodged with the Chinese failed to make it to Phnom Penh.
As Deputy Under-Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger
responded,
The drafters of this report had a special
responsibility to attempt to understand the
realities of the diplomatic environment at the
time of the Mayaguez seizure. They did not meet
this responsibility. Instead, they went out of their
way to develop wholly fictional diplomatic scenarios
which bore no resemblance to fact or reality, and then
criticized the Administration for its "failure" to
pursue their fantasies.(181)
The Mayaguez incident illustrates the problems with
the post-War Powers Resolution relationship between the
president and the Congress.

Real world time constraints

and threats to American citizens still required timely
responses by the president.

Congress was no more able to

respond quickly as a coordinated body than they were prior
to the War Powers Act.
There is little doubt that President Ford failed to
meet all the conditions outlined in the War Powers Act.

131

He clearly did not consult with the Congress prior to
ordering military action.

The point is that few members

of Congress seemed to care.

They still expected the

president to act quickly and decisively to protect the
lives of Americans overseas.

Expansion of the president's

war powers theoretically may have stopped because of the
War Powers Act and its implied reassertion of Congress'
war making powers.

In reality, expansion of presidential

war powers probably did slow down or stop because of the
mere threat that Congress might assert itself through the
provisions of the War Powers Act.

However, when an

emergency involving American lives was involved, President
Ford seemed quite willing to risk that threat while
complying with those provisions of the act that were
convenient.
Failure of the Congress to pressure the president to
follow the provisions of the War Powers Act may well
stem from the fact that few in Congress care about the
execution of military operations.

Domestic issues fulfill

members' political aspirations much more neatly as they
serve their constituent districts.

The fact that the War

Powers Act was even passed in the first place does not
necessarily indicate a renewed interest in defense policy
by the Congress.

It is equally likely that individual

members of Congress supported the War Powers Act because of
a popular notion that presidential power had been abused
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and it was time for Congress to act to limit that power.
Weakening of the presidency by Watergate may be just as
responsible for the War Powers Act as presidential action
in the war making arena.

CHAPTER VIII. CARTER-HOSTAGES IN IRAN
The Mayaguez incident indicated that as long as the
military operation was successful, a president could still
act swiftly and with resolve in spite of restrictions at
least symbolicly imposed by the War Powers Resolution.

The

difficulties in planning and executing the Mayaguez rescue
also illustrated the need for the United States military to
develop a fast-reaction multiservice counterterrorist
force.

Such a force was developed and trained during

the late 1970s. The Delta Force was designed from the
beginning to specialize in counter terrorism using elite
special forces from all branches of the military.

They

were to be able to quickly plan and execute rescue
operations anywhere on the globe against the spectrum of
terrorist threats.
The 1979 revolution in Iran sowed the seeds for the
first use of the new Delta Force in a counter terrorist
situation.

While the details of that revolution are too

lengthy to discuss here, it will suffice to say that the
Iranian situation reached crisis proportions on November 4,
1979 when revolutionary Iranian students stormed the U.S.
embassy in Tehran and captured the American personnel
working there.

The hostage-taking was reportedly in

response to U.S. acceptance of the exiled Shah into the
United States for medical treatment.
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This case illustrates a situation similar to that
discussed during the Ford administration, but shows the
political cost of military failure.

It represents yet

another post-War Powers Act military action directed by
the president with minimal consultation with the Congress.
It also shows how the president can minimize opposition
from Congress by defining the operation as a rescue
attempt rather than calling it a military action.

We

quickly notice that every presidential military action
from the War Powers Act through the Reagan administration
has been in some way defined as a rescue operation.
While this case most closely reflects such an operation,
others appear to include military activity well beyond
that required to rescue a group of Americans on foreign
soil.
The initial American response to the hostage taking on
November 4th was composed of economic and diplomatic
actions.

President Carter ordered an embargo on Iranian

oil, a freeze on all Iranian monetary assets in the United
States, a ban on all pro-Khomeini demonstrations in the
city of Washington, review of all Iranian visas,
deportation of illegal Iranian aliens, and the ousting of
nearly all Iranian diplomats from the United States.
U.S. also secured a United Nations Security Council
resolution calling for the release of the hostages on
December 4, 1979.

The
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In addition/ the U.S. petitioned the International
Court of Justice in The Hague and won its case against Iran
on December 15th.

UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim began

his attempts to negotiate for release of the American
hostages in January/ 1980.
Shortly after November 4th, the president called on
the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their assessment on the
potential for a successful rescue operation.

General David

C. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs reported that
chances of a successful rescue operation were extremely
small because of a lack of good intelligence information on
the location of the hostages as well as information about
local conditions inside Iran.

He did, however, promise to

begin plans for such an operation, in case the need for it
would arise.
By late December, when the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan, the military option became more attractive to
President Carter.

The U.S.S.R. had vetoed UN Security

Council sanctions against Iran and the United States had
been unable to convince its allies to apply economic
sanctions without a UN resolution.

As the president said

on December 31,
This action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic
change in my own opinion of what the Soviets' ultimate
goals are than anything they've done in the previous
time I've been in office.(182)
The president was apparently publicly admitting the failure
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of a U.S. policy of quiet diplomacy.

He was about to adopt

a more confrontational approach.
Although a military option had become more attractive,
the president still had to consider the disadvantages.
With regard to the Soviet Union, the U.S. and Iran had
mutual security interests in the middle east.

Early use of

the military option would certainly destabilize U.S.
efforts for a regional security framework.(183)
The new year brought several new developments in the
hostage crisis.

On January 18th, the Special Coordination

Committee (SCC) of the National Security Council met to
discuss military deployments to the region and a planned
set of belligerent public statements designed to keep Iran
off balance and pressure American allies to adopt sanctions
against Iran.

General Jones reported that conditions for a

military operation were considerably more favorable than
they had been in November.

The president elected to give

diplomatic efforts more of a chance to work.
On the 28th of January, former Foreign Minister
Abulhassan Bani-Sadr was elected president of Iran.

He

would become the prime target of U.S. diplomatic efforts.
On the same day Canada shocked the world by announcing that
six U.S. embassy personnel had been hiding at the Canadian
embassy since November and had finally been able to escape
Iran

137

Few developments came about over the next two months
as the U.S. struggled to discuss the hostage issue with a
disjointed Iranian leadership. Two Farsi-speaking foreign
service officers with Iranian experience reported to the
president that a rescue operation at the earliest possible
moment offered the best chance for a safe return of the
hostages.

Although this report was not well received by

Secretary of State Vance, the viewpoint it represented was
becoming more fashionable among the president's advisors as
diplomatic efforts continued to fail.
By April 1st, the president had finally had enough of
the frustration.

Pierre Salinger reports that President

Carter determined that the segment of the Iranian
leadership desiring resolution of the hostage crisis either
did not have the capability or did not have the political
courage necessary to secure release of the hostages.(184)
With signs of even more instability in the Iranian
government and the Ayatollah Khomeini's frail health, the
president began to believe reports from Iranian sources
that a release might take months or even years without a
military action. Clearly, a policy of restraint was only
producing failure and humiliation.
The hostage crisis had a crippling effect on all the
president's other efforts as well.
some sort of action.

The time had come for

Although the U.S. did not formally

break diplomatic ties with Iran until April, planning for a

138

rescue operation had been going full speed ahead throughout
March.

The military planning group of the NSC met on March

11/ where National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski
suggested a threat of a U.S. naval blockade.
Cyrus Vance opposed a military option, maintaining
throughout the crisis that a diplomatic solution was the
only acceptable answer.

The Secretary of State claimed the

U.S. effort should be aimed at downplaying the crisis in
order to decrease its propaganda value to the Iranians.
After all, he said, the hostages were not in imminent
personal danger because of their propaganda value.(185)

A

military raid not only risked the lives of the hostages and
the participants, but U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf
would be threatened as well.
On March 2lst, the SCC discussed mining of Iranian
harbors.

Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs

David Newsom suggested that secret advance warning of a
naval blockade to Iranian moderates might secure the
hostages' release without spurring anti-American sentiment
caused by a surprise action.
The next day, President Carter held a NSC meeting at
Camp David to discuss the various military options.
General Jones began the meeting with a detailed briefing of
the rescue option.

While intelligence was better than

before, it was still impossible to know the exact location
of all the hostages.

The general said if a team could make
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it to the embassy wall undetected and all the hostages were
inside, there was a good chance that all of them could
successfully be rescued.(186)

Brzezinski agreed with

General Jones that detection during the ingress was a
rescue team's biggest worry.

Any plan would have to be

able to terminate and withdraw at any time.

This would

make the plan even more difficult.
In the first stage of a rescue operation, men and
equipment would be secretly prepositioned in the gulf
region.

For the insertion phase, eight RH-53D helicopters

and eight C-130 aircraft would depart from different
locations and fly over 500 miles at low level to
rendezvous at an airfield near Tabas known as "Desert
One."

The helicopters would refuel and pick up supplies

from the C-I30s.

The C-130s would egress the area while

the helicopters continued on to a remote site in the
mountains southeast of Tehran to wait for the cover of
darkness on the second night.
The actual extraction of hostages would take place on
the second night.

Delta team members would enter Tehran on

local vehicles and storm the embassy.

The helicopters

would make a brief appearance to pick up the team and the
hostages and fly to an abandoned airfield near Tehran where
they would meet awaiting transport aircraft and heavy
fighter air cover.

From there, the helicopters would be

abandoned and the team would fly out on the transports.
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General Jones worried aloud about the complexity of
the operation.

Defense Secretary Harold Brown examined the

other military options including the mining of harbors and
a naval blockade.

Risks for all the options were similar:

physical retaliation against the hostages, widespread
political repercussions, pushing Iran into the Soviet camp,
and difficulties for American allies.

Overall, the

Secretary liked the rescue option best.(187)

However, the

president decided there would be no rescue attempt unless
he had no other choice.
General Jones reminded President Carter that the
rescue mission would become more difficult as the summer
months approached.

The shorter nights would eventually

require a third night inside Iran in order to operate under
the cover of darkness.
On April 4th, the U.S. sent a secret message to
President Bani-Sadr indicating that internal pressures for
a military operation against Iran were increasing due to
Iran's failure to keep its promises.

The letter called for

immediate Iranian action or President Carter would be
forced to take decisive steps and pressure allied
governments to do the same.(188)

The president indicated

that economic sanctions were only the beginning of "sterner
measures," and that he was about to make some important
decisions about the hostage crisis.

The Iranian Foreign
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Ministry requested a clarification and was told that no
more clarifications would be given.
On April 7th, Carter called a meeting of the MSC to
discuss the Iranian government' s refusal to accept the
hostages from the students.

Khomeini had just announced

that the hostages' fate would not be determined until the
Iranian parliament had a chance to meet.

At the meeting,

the president ordered diplomatic pressures placed on allies
to break ties with Iran and U.S. military preparation for
action including the interruption of Iranian commerce.

He

stated his belief that no further negotiating options were
available.(188)
By April 8th, the White House staff narrowed down the
options to two choices.

The first option would be one of

escalating pressure and could include actions like a naval
blockade and the mining of Iranian harbors.
option was a military rescue attempt.

The second

The staff favored

this option because it would be quick, minimize loss of
life, puncture the Ayatollah's image of invincibility, and
avoid an unpredictable escalation.(189)
Brzezinski's note to the president on April 9th pushed
the rescue attempt idea.
In my view, a carefully planned and boldly executed
rescue operation represents the only realistic
prospect that the hostages-any of them-will be freed
in the foreseeable future. Our policy of restraint
has won us well-deserved understanding throughout the
world, but it has run out. It is the time for us
to act. Now.(189)
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At a foreign policy breakfast on April 11th, the president
made one last attempt to discuss mining and blockade
options.

Hamilton Jordan believes he had already made his

decision when he called for another NSC meeting at
noon.(190)
The lunch meeting included Vice President Mondale,
Brzezinski, Jordan, Lloyd Cutler, Secretary of Defense
Brown, General Jones, and Warren Christopher representing
the vacationing Secretary of State.

Secretary Vance was

not to hear of the decision to attempt a rescue until his
return on April 14th.
The president said that although Vance's view that a
diplomatic solution was the only acceptable one had been
his own over the course of his presidency, he now felt
military action was necessary.

Harold Brown discussed the

other military options and concluded that they would not
free the hostages.
probably would.

In his opinion, the rescue plan

In less than an hour, the NSC decided on

the rescue option.

General Jones reported the first

available date would be April 24th.

He was tasked to

finalize the plan stressing secrecy and surprise over the
use of large amounts of force.
Hamilton Jordan wrote the president a memo on April
12th in an effort to support his tough decision.

Analyzing

the situation, Jordan concluded it would be a "long, long
time" before the hostages came home without military
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assistance.

"Once you are satisfied with the soundness of

the rescue plan, I believe you should proceed with the
mission."(191)
The Secretary of State returned to Washington on April
14th and was briefed on the president's decision.

He

approached the president one last time with a list of
objections.

First, a rescue was a difficult option with

little chance for success.

If the operation did succeed, a

large number of hostages would probably be lost.

Even if

these hostages, escaped from Iran, others could easily be
taken.

Iranian reaction to such a move could cause an

Islamic holy war declared on the west.

A rescue attempt

would be a deception against our allies because the
economic sanctions had been sold as being done without
military force.

Finally, such a move could easily push

Iran closer to the Soviet Union.(192)
Carter offered Vance an opportunity to address the
NSC, but he still favored the rescue option.

The Secretary

indicated that he was forced to resign, but would wait
until after the rescue attempt to protect the security of
the operation.

On April 15th, the Secretary of State

addressed the NSC, but the decision had already been made.
No one present changed his opinion about the rescue option.
The foreign policy group met secretly with Colonel
Charlie Beckwith, commander of the Delta Force on April
16th.

Key planners for the operation would be Colonel
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Beckwith, Air Force Major General Philip Gast (Assistant
for Readiness at Tactical Air Command), and Army Major
General James Vaught, the task force commander.

Beckwith

was very impressed with the president's sense of
professionalism.

He remembers the president addressing

General Jones,
David, this is a military operation. You will run it.
By law you will keep the Secretary of Defense Dr.
Brown informed; and I'd appreciate it if you'd do the
same for me. I don't want anyone else in this room
involved.(193)
and to Colonel Beckwith,
I want you, before you leave for Iran, to assemble all
your force and when you think it's appropriate give
them a message from me. Tell them that in the event
this operation fails, for whatever reason, the fault
will not be theirs, it will be mine.
The second thing is, if any American is killed,
hostage or Delta Force, and if it is possible, as long
as it doesn't jeopardize the life of someone else, you
bring the body back.(194)
The president had ordered what had been his constant
concern, the safety of Americans.
Later, General Jones took Colonel Beckwith for a ride
and questioned him about the "real story" on the rescue
plan.

Beckwith assured him that Delta Force was ready and

quite capable of carrying out the rescue.
concern was entering Iran undetected.

His biggest

As he told Jordan,

The toughest part was getting into Iran undetected.
They had some pretty sophisticated radar equipment.
That's why the helicopters were so damn important,
because we could fly under their radar at treetop
level. One thing I learned in Nam is that if you
need one helicopter, you ask for two more, cause they
get sick real quick. And you gotta remember that
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we're flying in low at night over a long damn
distance. Choppers aren't made for that, so me and
Vaught and Gast all agreed in December that we
wouldn't leave Desert One for Tehran unless we had six
birds. I figured we'd lose one on the way to Iran,
one going into the compound, and maybe another one at
the soccer stadium across from the embassy where we
were going to take the hostages before lifting off.
That would've given me three, worst case. We could
have gotten out with three and made it to the desert
for the flight out.(195)
Army Chief of Staff General Edward Meyer and General
Jones were concerned about over control of command and
control elements during the operation based on their
Vietnam experience.

The president understood their concern

and reassured them that although he had ultimate authority,
he would not interfere with their planning or execution of
the rescue.
Early on the evening (Iran time) of April 24th,
eight helicopters left the USS Nimitz and headed for Iran.
Approximately two hours after takeoff, the number six
helicopter developed indications of a possible impending
blade failure and elected to abort.
and was abandoned.

The helicopter landed

The other helicopters picked up the

crew and continued.
As the flight continued, the formation encountered
intense dust storms, about which the weather forecasters
had known but failed to brief the crews.

Four hours into

the mission, the number five helicopter lost essential
flight instruments.

This helicopter reversed course and

flew two more hours back to the waiting carrier.

The crew
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was unaware the storm would be over in 25 minutes and the
Desert One weather was clear.
The remaining helicopters arrived at the rendezvous
point 85 minutes late because of the dust storms.

At this

point, they still had their pre-determined minimum of six
helicopters, but the crew found a hydraulic failure on the
number two helicopter shortly after landing.
At just before noon eastern time, the president called
Jordan into the Oval Office to inform him that two
helicopters were down and the Secretary of State would be
resigning after the mission.

The president and his staff

continued their normal schedules waiting for more news from
Iran.
With the latest hydraulic failure, Colonel Beckwith
chose to abort the mission.

The president was called out

of a campaign staff meeting at 4:30pm to receive the call.
With Mondale and Jordan present, President Carter approved
the abort recommended by Colonel Beckwith.

He made no

mention of attempting to continue with less than six
helicopters.
While organizing to withdraw, the rescue team
encountered a number of problems.
intruding vehicles.

First was the problem of

A bus with 44 people on board wandered

into the middle of the refueling operation.

The team

captured the bus and held it temporarily until they were
ready to leave.

A fuel truck and a pick-up also drove into
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the area.

The team fired on the fuel truck.

Its driver

stopped and ran to the other truck and escaped.

Beckwith

was not overly concerned because he assumed they had
surprised smugglers who thought they had been discovered by
government troops.(196)
Beckwith's more serious problems developed during the
refueling operation.

Maneuvering in blowing dust, one of

the helicopters collided with a C-130 creating a large
explosion.

Eight crewmen died and five more were wounded.

The Delta team abandoned the remaining helicopters and
withdrew on the remaining C-130s.

Unfortunately, the team

was unable to recover the dead in the burning wreckage.
President Carter immediately began to plan for the
post-mission crisis.

His first priority was to convince

the Iranians that they were not being invaded, but rather
an attempt to rescue the hostages had failed.(197)

He

would also need to notify Congress, other countries and the
American people.

The president elected to wait to notify

anyone until the team had safely exited Iranian airspace.
The U.8. immediately sent a secret message to Iran
explaining the rescue attempt.

In a rather bizarre

message, State Department officials suggested the generous
aspects of the Koran and indicated the Iranians might take
the hostages to visit the crash site on their way out after
release.

Five main themes were pursued.

First, the

Islamic revolution had already been successful. Since the
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revolution had been a success, the hostages no longer
served a useful purpose.

Second, the failure of the

rescue mission showed the justness of their being taken.
Third, the hostages should be released since we knew the
Iranians never intended to harm them, but were merely
expressing their hatred for the American government.
Fourth, the captors were now victorious heroes, and
finally, a hostage release would show an act of mercy by
the Ayatollah.(198)
Hamilton Jordan expressed two other concerns.(199)
First, he felt the aborted mission would be politically
damaging because a failure would confirm an image of
ineptness that had surrounded Carter's handling of the
hostage crisis.

Jordan was also worried that the president

had violated the War Powers Act by not officially informing
Congress before committing troops to action.
The Ayatollah responded to the State Department
message quickly, indicating that the hostages would not be
harmed out of revenge for the rescue attempt.

He did,

however, say that they now had to be dispersed to deter any
further rescue attempts by the United States.
A number of lessons can be learned from the aborted
rescue mission in Iran.
overridden by technology.

First, judgment can easily be
Two helicopters appear to have

aborted early despite the fact that they were still
flyable.

The "impending blade failure" indication was a
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fleet-wide problem with no historical basis in fact.

The

complex sensing system on the blades of the RH-53 had never
before accurately indicated an impending blade failure.
There is room to second-guess the crew about its decision
to abort.(200)
The second helicopter aborted for "essential flight
instruments."

While instruments were required for flight

in the dust storms, landing and waiting out the storm in
order to fly in the clear was an option.

In this case, a

complete weather forecast might have saved the operation.
The second lesson concerns the president's
relationship with his military leaders.

Although

considerable criticism was aimed at the president about
over control, he had made considerable efforts to avoid
this problem from the beginning.

He was painfully aware of

the command and control problems in Vietnam, and made every
effort, according to the Joint Chiefs and Colonel Beckwith,
to avoid repeating those errors.

There is no evidence the

military leaders of the operation felt overridden by their
commander-in-chief.

In fact, when Hamilton Jordan

interviewed Colonel Beckwith after the mission, he asked
what Beckwith would have done had he received a message
from the president to go with five helicopters.

The

colonel told him, "I'd have said, I can't hear you, we're
coming out."(201)
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Other analysts were not so generous.

Paul Ryan,

writing on why the rescue attempt failed, cites a flawed
chain of command and inadequate coordination.

He claims

the Joint Chiefs of Staff never got involved in the
detailed planning of the operation and thus, never provided
a necessary "devil's advocate."

Ryan writes,

In sum, the actors included a president anxious to
avoid any semblance of an uncertain procrastinator;
a pugnacious but militarily unqualified national
security advisor pressing for covert action to rescue
the hostages; a cautious secretary of state who
anticipated trouble if the military rescue went
forward; a defense secretary whose role in the entire
affair remains vague; a chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff under pressure to keep the operation small
and, above all, secret; a distinguished combat general
expected to organize and train a multiservice force
for a highly complicated operation to be launched in
the shortest possible time, but to avoid much killing;
and last, a highly competent helicopter commander and
equally distinguished commando officer whose
recommendation for a minimum of nine helicopters had
been turned down, a decision that augured ill for
the mission.(202)
While a good portion of this statement may be true, Ryan
fails to realize that this situation is not unique.
are the things of which crises are made.
studied so far provides similar elements.

Such

Every case
This operation

just happened to fail.
The president addressed the concern over the War
Powers Act by reporting to Congress on April 26th.
text of his message appears in the appendix.
reaction was mixed.

The

As expected,

While some applauded the president's

efforts to take charge of the crisis, others condemned him
for the loss of American lives in the unsuccessful rescue
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attempt.

Perhaps surprisingly, little was heard from the

Congress about failure to consult prior to the operation.
President Carter successfully described the mission as a
rescue effort, not a military operation, whose need for
secrecy outweighed the need for prior consultation.
Although the political price of failure was high, the
president's war powers were basically left intact.

Once

again the president had acted before consulting Congress
and got away with it despite the existence of the War
Powers Act.

CHAPTER IX. REAGAN-RESCUE IN GRENADA
Ronald Reagan took office in January, 1981 with a
position that the nation had lost its sense of pride.

A

combination of economic woes and the post-Vietnam/Watergate
depression had resulted in an embarrassing hostage
situation in Iran.

President Carter's failed attempt at a

hostage rescue was just one more contributor to a national
defeatist attitude.

With Reagan's flag waving rhetoric

and emphasis on a strong military establishment, it may be
surprising that he became the first president since 1973
to effectively acknowledge the limits on power established
by the War Powers Act.

In fact two fine examples stand

out during the Reagan presidency to illustrate the
president's compliance with the War Powers Act.

The

deployment of Marines to Lebanon provides the first case
where a president consulted with the Congress to determine
the conditions for deployment.
The invasion of the tiny island nation of Grenada in
1983 also provides an example of the War Powers Act at
work.

Although it does not "fit" the structure of the law

as neatly as the Marines in Lebanon, the Grenada invasion
provides circumstances similar to those found in the
Iranian hostage rescue, and shows presidential compliance
with the War Powers Act and a more successful military
outcome.
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Grenada is a small island nation in the Caribbean with
a population of approximately 100,000 people.

It gained

its independence from Great Britain on February 7, 1974.
Although initially democratic, the government of Grenada
quickly shifted toward a Marxist position.

In 1976, a

coalition of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) and other
opposition parties won 48% of the vote.

The NJM was the

leading communist party in Grenada.
In March 1979, while Prime Minister Eric Gairy visited
New York, the NJM carried out a coup with little
resistance.

It named Maurice Bishop Prime Minister on

March 13th.

Bishop and the NJM went about installing a

Cuban style of government.

By 1980, Cuban military

advisors and construction workers were building an airport
at Point Salines.
In June, 1982, Bishop banned all opposition
newspapers.

By 1983, he found himself in a power struggle

with his deputy prime minister Bernard Coard, leader of a
radical faction of the New Jewel Movement.

During the

summer, the NJM carried out extended debates about Bishop's
future.
On October 12, 1983, Coard's faction placed Bishop
under house arrest.
the NJM.

On October 14th, he was expelled from

Bishop's supporters freed him on the 19th, but

People's Revolutionary Army troops loyal to the Central

154

Committee recaptured him and later murdered the former
prime minister and his close supporters.
The United States had been closely watching
developments in Grenada since 1979.

Hugh O'Shaughnessy

suggests that the State Department and the Pentagon had
been secretly contemplating an invasion since Gairy's
overthrow, but little evidence exists to support that
theory.(203)
During a speech announcing the Strategic Defense
Initiative on March 23, 1983, President Reagan publicized
intelligence reports he had received indicating a military
nature of the facilities being built at the Point Salines
airport.

After a June 7th meeting between Bishop and

National Security Advisor William Clark indicated a
complete denunciation of the U.S., the administration
became concerned about the safety of Americans in
Grenada.(204)
When General Hudson Austin, leader of the Grenadian
army imposed a 24 hour curfew, the president's advisors
began to worry about the safety of American medical
students studying at St. George's University Medical
School.

This medical school was actually a Brooklyn-based

school for students who were unable to gain acceptance to
medical schools in the United States.

With the Iran

hostages still clearly remembered, the administration badly
wanted to avoid another Tehran-type capture.

The recent
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tragedy concerning U.S. Marines in Beirut also weighed
heavily on the president's mind.
Eugenia Charles, prime minister of Dominica, informed
the president of "great risks for us all" in the current
Grenada situation.(205)

The Organization of Eastern

Caribbean States (OECS) requested American assistance due
to,
The current anarchic conditions, the serious
violations of human rights and bloodshed that have
occurred and the consequent unprecedented threat to
the peace and security of the region created by the
vacuum of authority in Grenada.
The OECS also pointed out,
That military forces and supplies are likely to be
shortly introduced to consolidate the position of the
regime and that the country can be used as a staging
post for acts of aggression against its members; and
that the capability of the Grenada armed forces is
already at a level of sophistication and size far
beyond the internal needs of the country.(206)
The day after Bishop's death, Secretary of Defense
Weinberger and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General John Vessey asked the president to approve a
planning effort to design a military rescue operation for
the medical students at St. George's.

General Vessey also

recommended turning the battle group of the UBS
Independence and Marine replacements bound for Lebanon to
the south in case they were needed in Grenada.

Planning

was complicated by the situation in Lebanon.
At 4:45pm on October 20th, Vice President Bush chaired
a meeting of the Special Situation Group (SSG) of the
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National Security Council.

The group discussed the events

in Grenada and dispersed to collect facts and begin
planning for potential military action.
At 2:00am on Saturday, October 22nd, Secretary
Weinberger contacted the president by secure telephone at
Augusta, Georgia to discuss plans, the OECS request, and
the short time to collect accurate intelligence.(207)
He urged the president to direct continuation of detailed
invasion planning.
At 9:00am, the planning group of the NSC met and spoke
with President Reagan again by secure phone.

The president

approved a landing of Navy SEALS to collect pre-landing
intelligence, and also the additional goal of restoring
democracy to Grenada.

He returned to Washington at 8:40am

on Sunday to address the attack on the Marines in Beirut.
A 4:00pm meeting of the NSC planning group was held to
discuss both Lebanon and Grenada.

At this meeting, the

president directed the go ahead for Operation Urgent Fury.
The JCS immediately dispatched the rules of engagement to
CINCLANT Admiral William McDonald.

Secretary Weinberger

authorized General Vessey to use the 82nd Airborne Division
as a back-up to the Marines already headed for Grenada.
The president immediately decided to notify
Congressional leaders and some allies before the landing.
General Vessey advised that Tuesday, October 25th was the
earliest possible landing time.

Reagan approved this time
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and stressed the need for operations security and
surprise.(208)
While the president had consulted extensively with
Congress about the deployment of Marines to Lebanon, he
elected to meet only with the Congressional leadership
about the Grenada invasion.

On Monday evening, October

24th, the president invited these leaders to the White
House for a briefing.

Secretary Weinberger briefed the

details of the situation, the risks of the operation, and
the hopes of the administration for a rescue of American
students and restoration of a democratic government to
Grenada.

General Vessey briefed the details of the

military plan with the Joint Chiefs and the National
Security Council in attendance to answer questions.
Weinberger reports that little comment was made by the
Congressional leadership.

Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill

reacted to the briefing by commenting, "I can only say, Mr.
President, God be with you, and good luck to us all."(209)
No opposition was voiced by anyone present.
Following the meeting, the president called Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain, but was unable
to convince her to support the American invasion.

The OECS

was informed that the U.S. would provide assistance.
By the time all the calls were made, U.S. Rangers were
airborne headed for Grenada.
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Meanwhile, Sir Paul Scoon, Governor-General of Grenada
had verbally appealed to Prime Minister Adams of Barbados
for help from an OECS peacekeeping force.

Although his

letter was sent October 24th, the government of Barbados
would not release it until after Scoon was rescued by U.S.
forces.
Dear Prime Minister,
You are aware that there is a vacuum of authority in
Grenada following the killing of the prime minister
and the subsequent serious violations of human rights
and bloodshed. I am, therefore, seriously concerned
over the lack of internal security in Grenada.
Consequently I am requesting your help to assist me
in stabilizing this grave and dangerous situation. It
is my desire that a peace-keeping force should be
established in Grenada to facilitate a rapid return to
peace and tranquility and also a return to democratic
rule. In this connection I am also seeking assistance
from the United States, from Jamaica, and from the
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States through its
current chairman, the Hon. Eugenia Charles, in the
spirit of the treaty establishing that organisation
to which my country is a signatory.
I have the honour to be
(signed)
Sir Paul Scoon, Governor-General(210)
Hugh O'Shaughnessy claims that the long time delay in
gaining release of the letter may indicate it was
fabricated after the Governor-General was safely aboard the
USS Guam.

Such a situation is unlikely since Prime

Minister Charles visited Washington just before the U.S.
landing communicating a very similar message.
In a move drawing criticism from the media, the
president approved CINCLANT's request that no press or
other people be allowed transportation to Grenada until the
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beachhead was secure.

Because of limited intelligence

about dangers on the island and a limited amount of
transportation available, the admiral wanted to delay
arrival of press teams.

The Secretary of Defense supported

CINCLANT, but stated a goal of allowing the press on the
island by the end of the first day of the invasion.

Actual

circumstances prevented this until the second day.
Forces for the invasion consisted of the USB Guam
carrying 20 helicopters under the command of Rear Admiral
Joseph Metcalf, the USS Saipan with 26 helicopters, and the
USS Independence carrying 70 aircraft.

The 22nd Marine

Amphibious Unit was aboard the battle group with over 400
Marines, five M-60 tanks, 13 amphibious armored vehicles,
and a jeep equipped with anti-aircraft missiles.

Their

mission was to capture the Pearls civil airport and secure
the capital city of St. George's.
AC-130 aircraft and 500 Rangers were based in
Barbados, less than an hour's flight away.

They were to

capture and secure the Point Salines airfield.
Reinforcements would come from the 82nd Airborne out of
Fort Bragg.
Members of the OECS provided policemen to restore
order.

Jamaica and Barbados also provided small numbers of

troops, although none saw action in the invasion itself.
Their role was to guard prisoners and patrol for resistance
after the U.S. force had taken the island.
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Resistance to the invasion would come primarily from
the People's Revolutionary Army and local militia units.
Support from the militia was now almost non-existent,
however, because of public outrage over the death of
Maurice Bishop.

Over 780 Cuban personnel were also on

Grenada.

Most were involved in building the Point Salines

airport.

While no more than 43 Cubans were designated as

military, all had the means and rudimentary training to
defend the field with small arms.(211)
Although U.S. forces encountered small pockets of
stiff resistance, military goals were met and the island
was secure by Thursday, October 27th.

Order was restored

and moves toward re-establishment of a democratic
government were made under OECS supervision.

The last

contingent of U.S. military forces left Grenada on December
12, 49 days after the invasion began.

Free elections

followed on December 19th.
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam explained the
U.S. objectives in Grenada as well as the international
legal justification for the invasion.(212)

Throughout the

action, America's two basic objectives were to rescue
American medical students and help Grenada re-establish
order.
Dam described three legal grounds for the invasion.
First was the appeal from Governor-General Scoon to the
OECS to help restore order.

"The invitation of lawful
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international law for foreign states to provide requested
assistance."
here.

There is still considerable room for debate

Just what constitutes "lawful governmental

authority?"

Most would agree this refers to the

recognized government in power.

The trouble is that not

every nation recognizes the same governments.

What

constitutes lawful authority for one nation might not for
another.
The second legal justification was the content of the
1981 OECS treaty.

Grenada was a signatory to that treaty

and requested assistance under its provisions.
Lastly,
U.S. action to secure and evacuate endangered U.S.
citizens on the island was undertaken in accordance
with well-established principles of international
law regarding the protection of one's nationals.
Although officials of the medical school claimed as late as
October 21st that no danger existed, the freed medical
students told otherwise.

According to Weinberger,

chancellor of the school Charles Modica,
secure in Brooklyn, seemed far more concerned with
whether his school was going to be able to continue
to collect tuition fees than he was with the actual
conditions on the island itself-or with the very
real risk that his students faced, particularly in
view of the 24 hour curfew that had been imposed.(205)
Despite denying the need, President Reagan complied
with the provisions of the War Powers Resolution.
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Although arguments could be made that he did not consult
the full Congress prior to initiating hostilities, he did
consult with the Congressional leadership.

In addition,

his recent consultation with the full Congress over
deployment of Marines to Beirut caused opponents to trust
his claim that time was not available for such consultation
in this case.

Security considerations about the rescue of

the American students also illustrated a need for secrecy
much the same as that claimed by President Carter in the
Iran case.
President Reagan did submit a full report to Congress
following the invasion, and more importantly, withdrew all
U.S. forces before the end of the sixty day limit.

He did

this despite the fact that after fighting had stopped, the
administration told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that the War Powers Act no longer applied to Marines on
Grenada because they were not in combat.(213)
Presidential war powers remained intact and
indications were that a balance could possibly be struck
between the war powers of the Congress and those of the
president.

The key to success seems to be good

communications between the president and Congress.
Because he had gained the trust of the Congress by
complying with the War Powers Act in the Lebanon
situation, President Reagan was able to act with less
consultation in the Grenada invasion.

Congress believed
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his claim that secrecy was important to the safety of
American students on the island because he had left no
reason for them to believe he wasn't telling the truth.
His compliance with all other provisions of the act once
the invasion began lends support to the view that Reagan
was acting in good faith.

Congress seemed more concerned

with how they were viewed than how they actually
participated in war making in this case.

CHAPTER X. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
As this study came to a close/ the United States had
just completed the largest military operation it had
undertaken since Vietnam.

Certainly, a good deal of study

may now be done about President George Bush's application
of presidential war powers during Operations Desert Shield
and Desert Storm.

A cursory look at the operations as they

happened seems to indicate a continuation of compliance
with the War Powers Act that began under President Reagan.
Although he claimed no need, the president made significant
efforts to consult with Congress during the deployment of
troops and before the beginning of hostilities.

President

Bush went so far as to secure legislation allowing military
action in the Persian Gulf.

No such action had been taken

since the declaration of war in World War II.

Whether he

would have taken action without Congressional approval is
open to question.

His speeches and historical patterns

indicate that he would have.
In the post-World War II world, the war powers
necessarily expanded with the larger role of the United
States as an economic and political power.

The advent of

nuclear weapons changed military and political
considerations with regard to foreign policy as well.
Where there had once been definite divisions between
war and peacetime, now the differences were less clear.
Advanced delivery vehicles allowed national leaders to
164
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transition from peace to war in a matter of minutes.

Cold

War tensions led to the development of organizations like
the Strategic Air Command and an intercontinental submarine
launched missile force designed to react in minutes to an
attack on the United States.

The United States was now

prepared for war every day.
President Truman was the first to deal with the
stresses of world leadership in a world of nuclear power.
His actions in Korea and a constant concern for escalation
to World War III brought on the development of the
undeclared and limited war.

No longer would conventional

military wisdom be able to govern the conduct of war
fighting.

Political considerations had become much more

important due to the types of weapons available.

Alliances

and membership in the United Nations seemed to downplay the
role of the Congress in military decision making.

The

president now claimed treaty considerations, the U.S. role
as a world leader, and fears about nuclear warfare as
grounds for unrestricted presidential action regarding war
powers.
President Eisenhower dealt with the aftermath of Korea
and large numbers of brushfire wars around the world.

He

recognized the importance of a national strategy concerning
the employment of nuclear weapons directly linked to U.S.
actions in the foreign policy realm.

He also became the

first president to have to face a potential enemy with a
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nuclear capability.

Although Congress paid to implement

the Eisenhower strategy, it had little role in developing
it.

For the first time, the president led significant

standing military forces during peacetime.

These forces

provided resources for the president to project power at
a scale never before imagined.
President Kennedy faced the limitations of a massive
retaliation strategy and was forced to deal with the first
real confrontation between the nuclear powers.

His actions

during the Cuban missile crisis show how decision making
had to be limited to a small group because of real world
time constraints.

Throughout this case, the Congress was

merely along for the ride.

War powers expansion here

refers to the "imminent danger" concept.

While the

president had always had the power to protect Americans
and American property from imminent danger, this type of
danger now existed every day.

The details of the Cuban

Missile Crisis illustrate how very real that danger is
and was.

While the list of presidential powers did not

grow longer, the actual effect of the president's war
powers grew much more serious.
President Johnson continued in this pattern of
increasing presidential control over war making.

By

securing passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution he led
the country into a war of tremendous expense.

Without a

declaration of war, the president now conducted the second
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most expensive war in American history.

Vietnam also

resulted in more U.S. casualties than any other military
action in history except for the world wars and the civil
war.

A price was also paid by the presidency as an

institution.

For the first time since World War II, the

Congress began to seriously discuss limiting the
president's war powers.
President Nixon inherited this dissent and contributed
to it himself by believing in the existence of strong
presidential war powers.

His decision to expand the

Vietnam war into Cambodia without consulting Congress
contributed at least in part to the War Powers Act.
It is possible the Congress was merely striking out at a
weakened president in the wake of Watergate.

In any case,

Congress had finally acted to reassert itself after
allowing the president to expand his war powers since World
War II.
Although expansion of presidential war powers slowed
or perhaps stopped after 1973, President Ford did not seem
to allow for much reassertion of power by the Congress.
His handling of the Mayaguez seizure in 1975 reflects a
general disregard for the provisions of the War Powers Act
while continuing to commit U.S. forces to action as a sole
decision maker.
A change in political parties in the White House did
not reverse this trend.

President Carter responded to the
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Iran hostage crisis much the way President Ford reacted to
the Mayaguez incident.

Although he spent a considerable

length of time working for a diplomatic solution, the
president's eventual use of a military option was planned
and carried out without consulting Congress.

Like his

predecessor, President Carter acknowledged the existence of
the War Powers Act by reporting to Congress after the fact,
but failed to meet its provisions for prior consultation.
President Reagan was the first to truly comply with
the provisions of the War Powers Act.

Although his own

statements and those of his cabinet reflect doubts about
the constitutionality of the law, he complied with its
provisions when deploying troops to Lebanon and Grenada.
It is unclear whether limits imposed by the Act really
controlled Reagan's use of presidential power or if they
just happened to coincide with what he felt were necessary
military actions.
Implications for the future suggest hope for a balance
between presidential and Congressional war powers.
Although I believe it would be foolish to think that a
president might feel restrained from action because of the
War Powers Act when handling a real emergency, it is
realistic to think that the War Powers Act is enough to
stop military adventuring by the president.

The real key

to the balance of power between the president and the
Congress will continue to be good communication.

As long
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as the members of Congress feel important to the process,
they seem willing to allow the president considerable
latitude with regard to war making.
Additionally, it is unlikely the Supreme Court will
ever rule on the constitutionality of the War Powers Act.
Its silence on the issue up to now indicates that the real
issue is the settlement of power division between the
president and the Congress.

Traditionally, the Court has

left these "political" issues for the people and the
institutions involved to decide.
Should it feel the need to comment, the Court would
likely support the president's commander-in-chief power in
a way similar to its comment on foreign policy in United
States v. Curtiss-Wriqht Export Corporation (Supreme
Court of the United States, 1936, 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct.
216, 81 L.Ed. 255).

In that case, Justice Sutherland's

majority opinion explains and accepts a theory of
presidential dominance over foreign policy.

Since foreign

policy and war making are often one in the same, it is
likely the Court would hold up presidential power in all
but the most extreme circumstances.
In summary, we may conclude that the role of the
president as the nation's commander-in-chief continued to
expand in the post-World War II world up until passage of
the War Powers Act of 1973.

Although the president's power

was not reduced by the legislation, the expansion of his
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power was brought under control by the Congress.

Today,

the president holds more military power than he did in 1945
because the U.S. position as a world leader and the
development of nuclear weapons require him to.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX
Following is the text of President Carter's April 2 6,
1980 communication to the House and Senate, under
provisions of the War Powers Act of 1973, concerning the
aborted hostage rescue operation in Iran:

Dear Mr. Speaker:
Dear Mr. President:
Because of my desire that Congress be informed on this
matter and consistent with the reporting provisions of the
War Powers Resolution of 1973 (Public Law 93-148), I submit
this report.
On April 24, 1980, elements of the United States Armed
Forces under my direction commenced the positioning stage
of a rescue operation which was designed, if the subsequent
stages had been executed, to effect the rescue of the
American hostages who have been held captive in Iran since
November 4, 1979, in clear violation of international law
and the norms of civilized conduct among nations. The
subsequent phases of the operation were not executed.
Instead, for the reasons described below, all these
elements were withdrawn from Iran and no hostilities
occurred.
The sole objective of the operation that actually
occurred was to position the rescue team for the subsequent
effort to withdraw the American hostages. The rescue team
was under my overall command and control and required my
approval before executing the subsequent phases of the
operation designed to effect the rescue itself. No such
approval was requested or given because, as described
below, the mission was aborted.
Beginning approximately 10:30 AM EST on April 24, six
U.S. C-130 transport aircraft and eight RH-53 helicopters
entered Iran airspace. Their crews were not equipped for
combat. Some of the C-130 aircraft carried a force of
approximately 90 members of the rescue team equipped for
combat, plus various support personnel.
From approximately 2 to 4 PM EST the six transports
and six of the eight helicopters landed at a remote desert
site in Iran approximately 200 miles from Tehran where they
172
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disembarked the rescue team, commenced refueling operations
and began to prepare for the subsequent phases.
During the flight to the remote desert site, two of
the eight helicopters developed operating difficulties.
One was forced to return to the carrier Nimitz; the second
was forced to land in the desert, but its crew was taken
aboard another of the helicopters and proceeded to the
landing site. Of the six helicopters which landed at the
remote desert site, one developed a serious hydraulic
problem and was unable to continue with the mission. The
operational plans called for a minimum of six helicopters
in good operational condition able to proceed from the
desert site. Eight helicopters had been included in the
force to provide sufficient redundancy without imposing
excessive strains on the refueling and exit requirements of
the operation. When the number of helicopters available to
continue dropped to five, it was determined that the
operation could not proceed as planned. Therefore, on the
recommendation of the force commander and my military
advisers, I decided to cancel the mission and ordered the
United States Armed Forces involved to return from Iran.
During the process of withdrawal, one of the
helicopters accidentally collided with one of the C-130
aircraft, which was preparing to take off, resulting in the
death of eight personnel and the injury of several others.
At this point, the decision was made to load all surviving
personnel aboard the remaining C-130 aircraft and to
abandon the remaining helicopters at the landing site.
Altogether, the United States Armed Forces remained on the
ground for a total of approximately three hours. The five
remaining aircraft took off about 5:45 PH EST and departed
from Iran airspace without further incident at about 8:00
PM EST on April 24. No United States Armed Forces remain
in Iran.
The remote desert area was selected to conceal this
phase of the mission from discovery. At no time during the
temporary presence of United States Armed Forces in Iran
did they encounter Iranian forces of any type. We believe,
in fact, that no Iranian military forces were in the desert
area, and that the Iranian forces were unaware of the
presence of United States Armed Forces until after their
departure from Iran. As planned, no hostilities occurred
during this phase of the mission-the only phase that was
executed.
At one point during the period in which United States
Armed Forces elements were on the ground at the desert
landing site a bus containing forty-four Iranian civilians
happened to pass along a nearby road. The bus was stopped

174

and then disabled. Its occupants were detained by United
States Armed Forces until their departure, and then
released unharmed. One truck closely followed by a second
vehicle also passed by while United States Armed Forces
elements were on the ground. These elements stopped the
truck by a shot into its headlights. The driver ran to the
second vehicle which then escaped across the desert.
Neither of these incidents affected the subsequent decision
to terminate the mission.
Our rescue team knew, and I knew, that the operation
was certain to be dangerous. We were all convinced that if
and when the rescue phase of the operation had been
commenced, it had an excellent chance of success. They
were all volunteers; they were all highly trained. I met
with their leaders before they went on this operation.
They knew then what hopes of mine and of all Americans they
carried with them. I share with the nation the highest
respect and appreciation for the ability and bravery of all
who participated in this mission.
To the families of those who died and who were
injured, I have expressed the admiration I feel for the
courage of their loved ones and the sorrow that I feel
personally for their sacrifice.
The mission on which they were embarked was a
humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran.
It was not directed against the people of Iran. It caused
no Iranian casualties.
This operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to
the President's powers under the Constitution as Chief
Executive and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States
Armed Forces, expressly recognized in Section 8(d)(1) of
the War Powers Resolution. In carrying out this operation,
the United States was acting wholly within its right in
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
to protect and rescue its citizens where the government of
the territory in which they are located is unable or
unwilling to protect them.
Sincerely,
JIMMY CARTER
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